1: Hoebel E-5 (1933) 1940 NO6 Comanche NO6

PROPERTY, INHERITANCE AND CONTRACT

421 Among settled peoples with fixed property and diversified economics the institutions of land tenure, disposition and inheritance, the treatment of chattels and the obligations of contract make up the better half of the material about which law centers. Or, as Professor Radcliffe-Brown writes, "With us one of the most important aspects of succession is the transmission of property by inheritance." But the study of Comanche practice offers little of note on this phase of the subject. For as Radcliffe-Brown continues, "Yet in some of the simplest societies this is a matter of almost no significance at all. In an Australian tribe, for example, a man possesses a few weapons, tools, utensils, and personal ornaments, things of little value or permanence. On his death some of them may be destroyed, others may be distributed among his relatives and friends. But their disposal is of so little importance, unless in relation to ritual, that it is often difficult to find any rules of customary procedure."[1]

If this statement had been written for the Comanches, it could scarcely have been more apt.

LAND TENURE

423 The Comanches had no concept of land value. As herding hunters, land was a matter of unconcern for them, being held neither individually, jointly nor communally. One may merely speak of land as having been communally occupied. The possibility of dividing hunting grounds or seed patches by families as was done among the northeastern Algonkians[2] was not considered, for as Schoolcraft wrote of the Comanches, "No dispute ever arises between the tribes (bands) with regard to their hunting grounds, the whole being held in common."[3] Within the tribe, therefore, land tenure was infer-
[648] tile soil for legal conflict. Trespass by persons of enemy tribes meant death, unless it was a woman whom they cared to take as a captive, or unless the warrior escaped by display of cunning or bravery. "Friendlies" could visit with impunity and partake of Comanche game without danger.

CHATTELS

422 Wealth for the Comanche centered largely in horses. The economics of horse ownership has been discussed above (pp. 14–15).

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[1] A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, *Patrilineal and Matrilineal Succession* (Iowa Law Review, Vol. XX), pp. 286 ff.

[2] F. G. Speck, *Family Hunting Territories* (Canadian Geological Survey, Memoir 70, 1915).

[3] Schoolcraft, *History of the Indian Tribes, etc.*, Vol. 2, p. 131.

2: Lee T-5 (1855-1858) 1957
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could hear distinctly the sound of their voices singing their 574
savage songs. Presently, came thrilling through the air, 727
mingling with the loud, shrill war whoop, a shriek of mortal agony. Again and again it was repeated, growing fainter and fainter, until, finally, it ceased, or, at least, failed to reach my ears.

At length, a party of six or seven came after me. While 727
passing through the strange encampment, I discovered pieces of soldier's clothing, which I recognized at once as the United States uniform. Moving on beyond the camp into a grove, a spectacle presented itself that froze my blood with horror. A white man had been subjected to the torture. He was not lashed to stakes as Stewart and Martin were, but a sharp stick had been thrust through his heel cords, by which he was suspended from a limb, with his head downward, as a butcher suspends a carcass in the shambles.

He, also, had been sacrificed with the accursed flints, his ears cut off, and tongue drawn out. A slight convulsive shrug of the shoulders, indicated that life was not wholly extinct. I gazed upon him in silence and terror and was relieved when they led me away. I concluded, from what I saw in their camp, he was a United States soldier, captured, probably, near one of the frontier outposts—such exploits not being unusual, numbers having been taken during my early residence in Texas, as far down as Fort Jesup in Louisiana.

The Indian policy of the United States, I am convinced, 648
is not the most advisable one. So long as it is continued, the frontier settlements will be constantly exposed to depredations, and prisoners subjected to the horrid cruelties I have described. They cherish an inveterate and undying hatred of the white race, whom they regard as usurpers—

2: Lee T-5 (1855-1858) 1957
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648 and are sanguine in the belief that the time will eventually arrive when they will be enabled, with the assistance of the Great Spirit, to sweep them from existence and reclaim their rightful inheritance. In their ignorance, they compare, favorably for themselves, their feeble strength with the whole power of the United States.

000 It would be cheaper for the government, in the end, instead of maintaining a line of military posts on the frontier—standing merely on the defensive—to send an army through their territories, giving them ocular demonstrations of its power, arresting their turbulent chiefs, and teaching them a lesson too impressive to be forgotten, that the rights of a citizen of the United States shall not be violated with impunity. Hundreds of our people, in the pursuit of their lawful business, are captured yearly, enslaved, and barbarously put to death, without attracting the attention of government, whereas if the hundredth part of the same outrages were committed by any enlightened nation, it would call upon the people to fly to arms. For my own part, I do not see why the arm of authority should not be stretched forth to protect the outraged citizen at the headwaters of the Guadaloupe with the same promptness it is to protect him in Paraguay, or on the Gulf of Mexico.

221 The camp of the Spotted Leopard, as has previously been
241 seen, was situated at the source of the Boge Lescoha, at the foot of a mountain range. Fifty miles south, at the other extremity of the valley, were his planting grounds, where a small village had been constructed, and where a number of the tribe, principally squaws, usually remained.

727 I had been here several months when a party arrived from the plantation, among whom I observed were three white women, notwithstanding their faces were painted.

2: Lee T-5 (1855-1858) 1957
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oooobered by the reader that I have now brought down this narrative to the month of May last, wherefore the object of the journey upon which the Indian chief, at this point, is ready to depart, and which I gathered, both from himself and various other sources, may be regarded in many quarters as exceedingly important.

728 His destination was a village three days' journey to the 648 north. At this place a general convention had been called, to be composed of all the chiefs of all the different tribes inhabitating the country between the northern bounds of Mexico and the regions of perpetual snow. The object of the convention was to induce the Indian nations, hitherto at variance, to bury the hatchet as between themselves, smoke the peace pipe, and unite in a universal bond of brotherhood, for the purpose of preventing the whites from passing through their territories to the settlements on the Pacific Coast.

It was, as I then understood it, and now believe, to enter into an alliance with the view of waging an exterminating and implacable war upon every train of emigrants or other party moving towards California, Oregon, the Great Salt Lake, or other points in either of those directions. How it terminated, circumstances unanticipated but of a most exciting and stirring character forbid my knowing, yet, that the design was precisely such as I have mentioned is a fact, which I beg all those who contemplate making the overland route to bear seriously in mind.

292 The Rolling Thunder, before taking his departure, arrayed himself with extraordinary care. A dozen scalps were attached to his war shirt; silver trinkets representing the moon in all its phases were fastened on his breast; his feet were clad in new and cunningly embroidered moccasins, and on his head rested a crown of feathers plucked from

3: Wallace & Hoebel
175, 648

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[For information on international relations between the Comanche and whites, and the history of such relations, see category 116, pp. 280-331, 338-353.]

3:Wallace & Hoebel E-4, 5 (1933, 1945) 1952
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I

Comanchería

ON a sultry summer day in June, 1875, a small band of starving Comanche Indians straggled in to Fort Sill, near the Wichita Mountains in what is now the southwestern part of the state of Oklahoma. There they surrendered to the military authorities.

So ended the reign of the Comanches on the Southwestern frontier. Their horses had been captured and destroyed; the buffalo were gone; most of their tipis had been burned. They had held out to the end, but the end was now upon them. They had come in to submit.

For a good 150 years, since first they had come down from the north, at first alone and later with the aid of their Kiowa allies, the Comanches had been the lords of the Southern Plains. They had decimated the pueblo of Pecos, within thirty miles of Santa Fé, New Mexico, so that in 1838 a pitiful surviving handful of this once-great pueblo abandoned it entirely. The Spanish frontier settlements of New Mexico had long been happy enough to let raiding Comanches pass without hindrance to carry their terrorizing forays into Old Mexico, a thousand miles down to Durango. They had fought the Texans, made off with their cattle, burned their homes, and effectively made their own lands unsafe for the white intruder. They had joyously fought and whipped at one time and another the Utes, Pawnees, Osages, Tonkawas, Apaches, and Navahos.

These were the "Spartans of the Prairies," of whom Thomas J. Farnham had written seven decades before, "their incomparable horse-

The Comanches

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« « « This *pukutsi* was going through the camp, singing as usual.

An old woman stopped him and said, "*Pukutsi*, I want you to kill me a buffalo. I need the hide to use for my saddle; I have no boys to get one for me."

He went and was gone from the camp for a long time. Finally he came back at night with the whole skin of a Pawnee, even with hands and feet still on it, and he hung it up like a man standing there against her arbor.

Some man saw it there and called in to her in her lodge, "That *pukutsi* is back. Your hide is out here on the arbor."

Early in the morning she got up and went out to get it. That human skin frightened her. Then that man came by and told her she should not have asked a *pukutsi* to do such a job. "He is afraid of nothing."

"Well, I didn't ask him to bring me an enemy," she complained. But that's the way it is with *pukutsi*. You ask them to do one thing and they do just the opposite.

When she got over her first scare, the old woman jumped up and down and sang. She had an enemy scalp, which she kept. » » »

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The waging of war was a matter of individual initiative, but the making of peace was a matter for the chiefs. A war leader on a raid could make peace in behalf of his own party on his own authority, but such a peace was not binding upon other members of the band or upon the tribe. Band peace was made only upon consent of the war leaders, the council of elders, and the head chief. Tribal peace could be attained only when agreed upon and recognized by all the bands.

For all their devotion to war, the Comanches accepted the fact that a people cannot fight everybody on all fronts at once. The home base had to afford some measure of security for hunting and everyday living. Thus the Comanches worked out a sort of national policy of defensive alliances with their more powerful neighbors to their north, keeping their southern, western, and eastern frontiers open for far-ranging aggressive action.

Peace with the Kiowas was cemented in 1790 through the good offices of a mutual Spanish friend.[29] No details of this step are known,

3: Wallace & Hoebel E-4, 5 (1933, 1945) 1952
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but it established a co-operative alliance that grew into the firmest of intertribal friendships, unbroken to this very day.

The Kiowas and Comanches together achieved peace with the Cheyennes in 1840. The details of the steps leading up to this agreement have, from the Cheyenne side of the picture, been recorded by Grinnell[30] and analyzed by Llewellyn and Hoebel.[31] Earlier in this book we described the gift exchanges that signalized the binding of the peace. From 1840 on, there were no disturbances between the Comanches and Cheyennes, although between these tribes there never developed the close symbiotic relations that characterized the Comanche-Kiowa ties.

Back to back, territorially speaking, the Southern Cheyenne, Kiowa, and Comanche combine formed a hard, solid core of security from which each tribe could push its warlike activities against outsiders.

There do not seem to be any accounts or memories of how the Comanches established peaceful relations with their eastern neighbors, the Wichitas. Perhaps they never regarded these people as objects of aggression.

Sporadic and limited peace gestures were made toward the Utes and Apaches in later years. They were never the consequence of a national policy but rather of individual motivations, as the following accounts indicate.

« « « Once there were a bunch of Comanches out looking for trouble. They came upon a bunch of Utes and started a fight.

There was a captive Ute woman with the Comanches whose son was a Comanche warrior. Because she got scared for her son's safety, she rode out between the fighters, holding up her hands and calling for them to stop.

"I am on both sides," she cried. "I am a Ute. My son is a Comanche. I don't want my kinspeople to be killing each other."

One of the Ute chiefs rode up to her. The woman held out her hand, but the Ute chief would not accept it.

[29] Mooney, "Calendar History of the Kiowa," *loc. cit.*, 162–65.

[30] Grinnell, *The Fighting Cheyennes*, 60–66.

[31] Llewellyn and Hoebel, *op. cit.*, 91–94.

3: Wallace & Hoebel E-4, 5 (1933, 1945) 1952
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He said, "No, not until I know if your chiefs have sent you."

Then her son, who was a war chief, rode up. He was willing that they should stop fighting. And so a truce was made.

The two bands went into camp, the Utes on one side of a hill, the Comanches on the other.

Some Comanche hunters returning to their camp did not know about the truce. They came upon a Ute, whom they killed and scalped. Then they went right on into the Ute camp by mistake, singing the Victory Song and carrying his scalp.

The chief of the Utes calmed his people. "This is a mistake," he told them. "It is all right. We are at peace. We shall not get mad about this thing."

So the Comanche hunters went back and found their own camp.

When he heard the news, a Comanche chief went over to see the Utes. "This was a mistake," he told them. "However, it is not necessary to do anything about it. One of our men was killed in that battle we were having. Things are now even."

The Utes agreed.

The next day a council of ten Ute chiefs came to the Comanche camp to visit the Ute woman, and they found that she was a sister to one of them. They took her and her family back to the Ute camp to visit her parents, who were still living. There they gave her a special tipi with an antelope skin tied to a pole as a special sign.

At the end of four days, the Utes said, "Four days are now up. Now we shall separate."

The Utes wanted the Ute woman's son to stay with them. At first he refused, staying alone when the camps moved, to decide what to do. Finally, he took the Ute trail.

He came to the Ute camp and asked for their chief. The chief invited him to dismount, and told his wife to serve him a supper. The Comanche captive, his mother, was sent for to interpret. He told the chief of his desire to become a Ute.

This chief replied, "All right, you can be my son. But these Utes are bad. They might kill you sometime."

The Ute chief made him his son, and he named him *Wasape Sɔmanɛtɛ*. After a while the chief gave him a pack horse and sent him back to the Comanches.

3: Wallace & Hoebel E-4, 5 (1933, 1945) 1952
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Our people renamed him *Paruwa Sɜmɛno,* Ten Bears.[82] » » » 728 649

Greyfoot added a poignant scrap of detail as an epilogue to this account. The son of the Ute chief was dying of an incurable illness. He was not old enough to go to war, but his father wanted him to die the glorious death of a warrior. He did not want to see him waste away to nothing.

Acceding to the chieftain's wish, Ten Bears and a friend dressed in their war regalia, ready to meet the enemy. The sickly boy was dressed for war. In a pantomime of battle Ten Bears and his friend killed him. The Ute chief, in thanks for honoring his son, gave the boy's horse and clothing to them. That was when Ten Bears returned to the Comanches.

Except for the Kiowa and Cheyenne relations, Comanche peace pacts were touch and go. The temporary Ute peace could have been destroyed in the making by the Comanche hunters' killing the Ute had not the Ute chief been a man of power and forbearance. The delicate nature of such negotiations and the low level of mutual trust is revealed in Slope's account of a Tonkawa peace overture.

« « « A Comanche girl had died. Her mother wanted to leave the tribe so that she would see no more Comanche girls. There were only seven left in the family.

They were camping all by themselves when they were attacked by the Tonkawas, those man-eaters. Four of them were killed, and the mother and two of her children were captured.

After a year had passed, the Tonkawas decided they wanted peace with the Comanches, so they sent thirty warriors to escort the woman back to the tribe.

When they came to Comanche territory, they made a camp, and a Tonkawa chief and one warrior set out with the woman to look for the Comanches.

A Comanche war party, including some Kiowas, met them on a hill top. The Tonkawa signaled for friendship, so the Comanche leader came right up and shook hands before anything was said. The woman was glad. "This is what the Tonkawas want," she said.

[82] Informant: That's It.

3: Wallace & Hoebel E-4, 5 (1933, 1945) 1952
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While they were talking, some of the Comanche and Kiowa warriors drifted on and found the Tonkawa camp. The group on the hill heard a shot fired.

"Well, it's too late," said the Tonkawa chief, and he whirled his horse and rode off. The Comanche woman, who had become his wife, took a spear and scattered the Comanches. Thus the Tonkawa chief got away.

They started a general fight right then, the Tonkawas beat up that Comanche-Kiowa war party that day. They chased the Comanches a long way.

One Tonkawa was outstanding. The brother of Eagle Tail Feather shot his horse, but he was not hurt. » » »

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The Comanches seldom took the initiative at treaty-making with the whites; rather, it was the whites. In later days the preliminary procedure in getting the Comanches to make a treaty was about as follows: An agent acting under orders from Washington decided that a treaty was desirable. He then went into the Comanche country to visit with as many of the bands as he could locate. He told them that the "Big Chief" wanted to make peace and be friendly with them; that he hoped to see them at a certain time and place, probably in the vicinity of a trading house. He made a number of promises, gave a few presents, and got some Indian messengers to carry the news to other bands and tribes. If the chiefs promised to come in, and some nearly always would agree, preparations were made on a grand scale for the assembly.

Quantities of beads, hatchets, mirrors, fine combs, matches, cloth, and other articles which the Indians desired or needed were provided. A company of soldiers was sent along (in Texas, Texas Rangers, if available), commissioners to make the treaty, and the agents. By the date set, the council ground was alive with activity, but most of the time the only Indians present were those who hoped by their early arrival to secure more than their share of the spoils. A Comanche seldom kept an appointment on time; to do so sacrificed a measure of his independence. Some of the Comanche bands would not appear at all, because they had no confidence in the white man's treaties or in their own ability to achieve a diplomatic victory over

3: Wallace & Hoebel E-4, 5 (1933, 1945) 1952
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hunt to obtain a portion of their winter supply of meat, and the sale of buffalo robes was the source of a large part of their income. They preferred their own clothing obtained by means of the hunt to that provided by the government. The agent defended their cause, and the final decision was that they might continue to hunt off the reservation, but must be accompanied by a military escort when they did so.[18]

The regulation was tardy, for the day of the old-time summer communal hunt was past. Nevertheless, the whole tribe set out eagerly for their old hunting grounds. But there were no buffalo. Only white bones gleaming ghostlike in the sun, victims of the white hunters' long-range rifles, remained as a reminder of the vast herds that once covered the plains. And even the bones were not to lie undisturbed for long; they were to be ground up for fertilizer. From creek to creek the Comanches journeyed. Their scouts ranged far and wide seeking the herds. The few antelope they met hardly provided them with daily food. Still there were no buffalo, no feasts of marrow bones and tidbits, no racks of meat drying for their winter needs, no buffalo robes to turn the cold north wind.

"They will come when the leaves fall," the Indians said. But the frosts came and the weather grew colder, and still the plains were empty. The time allowed by the agent for the hunt expired. Some gave up hope and returned to the reservation, glad to get their rations of flour, sugar, rice, and beeves. The agent sent an emissary with food to bring the others back to the reservation. The aid came in good time, for they were starving. They had killed some of their ponies and were suffering in the season's early snowstorm. They accepted the inevitable and returned sadly with the emissary to the agency. Sullenness and despair fell upon them. The buffalo had failed, and they now began to realize for certain that their old way of life had ended. Several war chiefs abdicated, and there followed a noticeable trend away from communal life toward family life.

Now the Comanches began to turn in all seriousness to a source of religious solace that could not and has not failed them. The Sun Dance had failed them and they felt that their power-giving spirits

[18] Agent P. B. Hunt, *Annual Report*, 1878, in Commissioner of Indian Affairs, *Annual Report*, 1878, 60; Hunt to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, May 11, 1878, and reply, October 14, 1878.

7: Richardson D-4 (no date) 1929
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other Spanish explorers visited the high plains of Texas and the prairie country to the east, but the records they have left do not add greatly to our knowledge of the natives of the region. During the Seventeenth Century the upper Colorado and Concho region became especially well known to the Spanish since adventurers were attractd there by the pearls found in the mussels so plentiful in those streams. They found the Jumano Indian (probably a band of the Wichitas) in this region, who were mortal enemies of their neighbors the Apaches. Naturally the Jumano welcomed the Spanish as possible allies. The prospects of pearls appealed to Governor Cruzate of New Mexico just as the promise of a harvest of souls struck the imagination of Fray Nicolas Lopez, Custodian of Missions. Hence, in 1684-'85, a party of priests and soldiers established a temporary mission among the Jumano near modern Ballinger. Here, according to their chronicle, the Spanish and their Indian allies killed for a certain feast four thousand buffaloes. Although the Spanish had erected a crude building and planted crops the mission was soon abandoned because of conditions and circumstances that need not concern us in this paper.[2] However, it is significant that at this time Caddoan bands were to be found in the Abilene country, in the midst of the more nomadic Athapascans. Our section was border-land between the nomadic tribes of the plains country and the more sedentary Indians of central Texas, who raised gardens and built large and comparatively substantial grass lodges. Camp sites now being discovered and examined by members of this society confirm this fact. A few days ago at a point a few miles south of Abilene, Dr. Ray pointed out to me certain camp sites on or near loose soil well suited for the crude system of Indian farming. Here we found large fire circles and pieces of metates for grinding corn, indicative of the more permanent camp sites of the agricultural Indians; but at another site near by (although it may have been occupied many decades later or earlier), small piles of fire-stones scattered closely over a narrow valley, indicate that here, for a short while, a more nomadic people lived.

Early in the Eighteenth Century both the Spanish and the French came to know more about the Indians of Texas and their accounts

2. A good summary of these Spanish expeditions into West Texas is given by W. A. Stephenson, in the West Texas Historical Association Yearbook (Abilene, 1926), 11-64-84.

7: Richardson D-4 (no date) 1929
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Wichita NO 10

C
648 are much easier to interpret. During this century there was a southward shift among the more nomadic tribes in what is now eastern Colorado and New Mexico and western Kansas, Oklahoma and Texas. The Osages, in the northeast,[3] tended to drive the Wichitas south. Furthermore, at about the opening of the century, the Comanches, who were probably being crowded by the Cheyennes, came from the north into eastern New Mexico and the Panhandle of Texas. Here they clashed with the Apache tribes and Indian tradition tells of a terrible nine days' battle fought between the Comanches and the Lipan-Apaches on the *Rio del Fierro,* (River of Iron), which Bolton identifies as the Wichita.[4] The Apaches were forced to give way and retreat towards the west and south. The Comanches continued this southward migration and, in 1758, they and their allies, the Wichitas, Hasinaies, and probably some of the Caddo tribe proper attacked the Franciscan mission on the San Saba, near the present site of Menard, and killed two of the friars and several other Spaniards. Thenceforth the Comanches claimed as their home the country as far south as the San Saba, and, indeed, during the years that followed they occupied at one time or another most of the country as far south as Bexar. In his map of Texas in the eighteenth century, Bolton shows the Indian situation in the western half of Texas as follows: The Apaches occupy the region northwest of the *Camino Real,* which ran from the Presidio del Rio Grande to Bexar, with the Lipan-Apache extending as a kind of protruding finger eastward into the country around the present Mason; north of the Apaches are the Comanche tribes and east of these, divided by about the ninety-eighth meridian, were the Wichitas.[5] It would not do violence to the facts to state that the West Texas Indian situation remained thus until the Indians were displaced by white settlers.

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181 It has already been stated that the Wichitas were an agricultural people, although they relied extensively on the chase for subsistence and were fiercer and more nomadic than their other Caddoan kinsmen. On a framework of poles, sometimes fifty feet in diameter, they constructed comfortable grass lodges, the whole when completed looking somewhat like a giant beehive of the old fashion.
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3. See H. E. Bolton, Athanase De Mezieres and the Louisiana-Texas Frontier, 1768-1780 (Cleveland, 1914), 1-19, note 2, for the shifting during the eighteenth century.

4. Ibid., p. 25.

5. De Mezieres, I, Frontispiece.

7: Richardson D-4 (no date) 1929
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342 The Comanche tipi represented a wonderful combination of utility and portability. A dozen or more slender poles were tied together at the top and set up so as to form the frame-work of an irregular cone of such diameter as the material at hand and the size of the family made practicable. This framework was covered with buffalo hides, flesh side out, and offered excellent shelter, while an opening and flap at the top assured ventilation. The flap could always be adjusted so that the opening was protected from the prevailing wind on the same principle that ventilators on our modern buildings are constructed so as to shift with the wind. Recently the writer spent a hot August evening in a Comanche tipi constructed along traditional lines except that canvas rather buffalo hides served for covering. There was no smoke and the place was comfortably cool, notwithstanding the small fire in the center. Close examination re-
[354] vealed the fact that the covering was not drawn completely to the ground, but that instead an air space of several inches was left all around. This, together with the opening at the top, made for perfect ventilation. Had the night been cold, the canvas could have been drawn completely to the ground, thus sacrificing ventilation to comfort.

● 648 The Comanches were a nomadic people and as late as 1850 a
619 wandering band might be found in the valley of the Platte or in
[361] the plains of Durango, fifteen hundred miles further south. There was not a single Comanche tribe, but rather several distinct tribes, having but few relations the one with the other. The Penatekas, were the southernmost band or tribe and are most often heard of in the history of Texas. Occasionally they got in touch with the northern bands when the latter came down to the Brazos or Clear Fork to spend the winter or when some of the young men of the different bands, joined perhaps by their allies the Kiowas, put out
[378] for the Mexican border for a joint raid. Sometimes the Penatekas were even in a state of war with their northern kinsmen. Naturally when the chiefs of a given band made a treaty it was binding only on their immediate followers. Hence, their kinsmen who lived afar off were likely to ignore it even if they should hear of it. Furthermore, the nomadic habits of the Indians and the resultant divisions and subdivisions of the bands into small parties away from responsible leaders made it impossible for the chiefs to control their

7: Richardson D-4 (no date) 1929
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own men. It is safe to say that the wild Comanches never kept a treaty and in the matter of treaty breaking some excellent examples were set by their white neighbors.[13]

The records available—and they are exceedingly scant and unsatisfactory—indicate that the political institutions of the Comanches were meager and poorly defined. Each band had a head civil chief and a head war chief, selected by the council of chiefs and leading men. In this connection I may state that I have never seen any satisfactory account of the manner in which chiefs were selected, or any definition of just what constituted a chief. It appears that heredity was one consideration but not the only matter of determining the status of a man in the tribe. Absolutism and the idea of divine right found little consideration in a Comanche camp. The chief or head man who proved tactless, cowardly, or inefficient would soon be supplanted; but this readjustment would likely take place gradually and by common consent rather than by formal procedure.

In all matters, even war, the head civil chief was superior to his war chief, but if the civil chief was aged and decrepit and the war chief vigorous and popular this civil superiority would be more theoretical than real. Verily, among the Comanches the man made the office and not the office the man. However, the war chief was apt to be the son, natural or adopted, of the head civil chief; and the most insolent Comanche brave had respect for the council of his elders.[14]

In theory, at least, the council was supreme, but its decisions were often indefinite and left each chief or head man a large measure of freedom of action. Generally the majority made little effort to impose its will on the minority.

During the later period, custom and the concensus of opinion, public opinion, we might call it, were practically the only sanctions behind Comanche law. However, it is likely that before the tribe

13. The Spaniards often commented on the difficulty of holding the Comanches to treaties. See The Baron de Ripperda to the Viceroy, August 25, 1772, in Bolton's De Mezieres, as cited, I, 342. The Anglo-Americans found that this problem increased with the passing of the years.

14. These statements represent my own opinions based on extensive reading and study in both Spanish and English sources. The tribal practices in these matters varied if we are to reconcile the different conflicting accounts. Josiah Gregg gives the matter some consideration. See Commerce of the Prairies (New York, 1845), 306-307, in R. G. Thwaite's Early Western Travels, XX, 342-343.

7: Richardson D-4 (no date) 1929
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upon the side of the horse thus making of the animal a perfect screen between themselves and an imaginary enemy. "In this wonderful condition," he relates, "he will hang whilst his horse is at fullest speed, carrying with him his bow and his shield, and also long lance of fourteen feet in length, all or either of which he will wield upon his enemy as he passes; rising and throwing his arrows over the horses' back, or with equal ease and equal success under the horse's neck." Finally the artist learned that a partial explanation of the marvel was in the fact that a short hair halter was passed under the neck of the horse and both ends tightly braided into the mane on the withers. Through this loop the young warrier ran his arm and thus secured an anchor and rest for the fore part of his body.[20]

Horses were naturally the only form of wealth available to the Comanches. They were both useful and easily moved and an Indian's wealth was measured by the number of horses he possessed. Their horses were of good, indifferent or poor quality, depending on the success a given band had had in recruiting their scrubby mustang herds with better bred animals taken from the Mexican or Anglo-American frontier. With these Indians horse-stealing was both a science and an art and no warrior's training was complete until he was proficient in this respect. At the camp on the Clear Fork, in 1854, previously referred to, one warrior carried a shield "Ornamented with a *human scalp*, a grizzly bear's claw and a mule's tail, significant of the brave warrior and successful hunter and horse-thief."[21] Chief Is-sa-keep, of a band of northern Comanches, once told Captain Marcy that his four sons were as fine young men as could be found, that they were a great comfort to him in his old age, "and could steal more horses than any other young men in his band."[22] The brave's best horse was always saved for the hunt or war party and the Indian had that love for their favorite steed that always characterizes good horsemen.

As is the case among most savage peoples, war was a normal condition with the Comanches. For instance if expediency dictated that there be peace between the Comanches and Osages, the Texas

20. North American Indians, II, 73-74.
21. Parker, Notes Taken with Marcy, 195.
22. Exploration of the Red River, 97.

7: Richardson D-4 (no date) 1929
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border was still inviting and there the braves could find horses to steal and ranches to plunder; if there must be peace with Texas, there was at least one happy war ground, which according to Comanche ethics, was always a legitimate field of operation. That was Mexico. And hither the young braves would go, notwithstanding the more or less perfunctory efforts of the governments of the United States and Texas to stop them.

War with the Comanches might call forth united tribal effort or it might concern but a small party of warriors, depending on the circumstances. The chief or head man who wished to lead off a war party paraded through the camp, carrying in some cases a long pole with a red flag tipped with eagle's feathers, chanting a war song. If he was a popular leader and the bands was in a war mood, or if he could convince the young braves that his enterprise promised large returns by way of scalps, prisoners and booty, he would soon collect about him many warriors. War dances would be held, the leading men would make talks, runners would be sent to other bands and the expedition would take on large proportions. No warrior was obliged to join, but the young man who always stayed at camp would obviously soon become the object of much ridicule. However, the tribe was not entirely at the mercy of these young hot-spurs. If the expedition was likely to result in the flagrant violation of a popular treaty or if it was calculated to bring down upon the tribe the wrath of a powerful enemy, a more conservative sentiment would prevail and the movement would be nipped in the bud.

In this connection some description of Comanche weapons should be given. Although they acquired a few guns from white traders at a very early date, primitive weapons were all that a great majority of the tribesmen had as late as the middle of the nineteenth century. Their bows were of bois d'arc, rather short for long bows, being ordinarily not more than three feet in length. Sometimes they were wrapped with the sinew of the deer, and the bow string was of the same material. Their arrows were about twenty inches long, of flexible wood, with a triangular spike, or point, of iron. Two feathers intersecting each other at right angles were bound to the other extremity of the arrow and served to guide it. They frequently carried lances, one of which is described as "a piece of

11: Casagrande E,L-5 (1940) 1954
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177 and Texans pushing from the south until the Comanche were contained on the Fort Sill Reservation in 1875. The submersion of the Comanche by White culture was well under way by the latter date and progressed at an ever accelerating tempo.

175 The Comanche first loomed upon the horizon of the Spanish Southwest shortly after the turn of the eighteenth century. Their presence in New Mexico was definitely [231] noted in 1705. They were already horse Indians at this date, having gotten the horse no later than 1690–1700.[13] As early as 175 1713[14] the Comanche were in conflict with ● 648 both the Spanish and the more peaceable 721 Indian tribes of the region and had embarked upon their historic role of marauders and horse thieves, striking always to the southwest. Although the province of New Mexico received the brunt of their attack, by 1758 they had destroyed a presidio in Texas and by 1776 they were crossing the Rio Grande to attack the Lipan as well as 175 the Spanish settlements. De Croix, a 648 Spanish general, describes the situation in his General Report of 1781 in the following terms:[15]

> [721] "But these injuries are not comparable to those which the Comanche inflict. The province is overrun with these Indians, now alone, or as allies of the Nations of the North; at the moment not a foot of land is free from hostility. Its fruits of the field are destroyed, cattle ranches and farms abandoned, and the settlers in terror are fleeing to the settlements, nor do they venture to leave their neighborhood without a troop escort."

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(113) Okla., 1952). See also Ralph Linton in Abram
[175] Kardiner, The Psychological Frontiers of Society
[178] (Columbia University Press, New York 1945), and E. A. Hoebel, The Political Organization and Law-Ways of the Comanche Indians, Memoirs, AAA No. 54 (1940).

[113] [13] F. Haines, The Northward Spread of Horses among the Plains Indians, AA 40.435 (1938).

[113] [14] D. B. Shimkin, Shoshone-Comanche Origins and Migrations, Proc., Sixth Pacific Science Congress, Vol. IV: 17-25, p. 21 (1939).

[15] A. B. Thomas, Teodoro de Croix and the Northern Frontier of New Spain 1776-1783, p. 77 (Norman, Okla., 1941).

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11: Casagrande E,L-5 (1940) 1954
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175 This dark picture of conflict is tempered
● 648 somewhat by the fact that the Comanche were admitted to the Taos fair in 1748 or 1749 and attended again in 1751[14]—the documents left by the military men and governors would tend to minimize these more peaceable events. In 1776, Anza, the governor of New Mexico, inaugurated a military campaign against the Comanche and sought them out in their own country northeast of New Mexico. In 1779 the Comanche received their first major defeat at Spanish hands near what is now Pueblo,
[728] Colorado. Peace was soon established and, after a formal treaty was negotiated in 1786, relations with the Spanish became
[439] more cordial. Comanche came to the Pueblo of Santa Fe and Pecos in great numbers, and Comanchéros," as the traders from the New Mexican settlements were known, visited them frequently. Ugarte, Commander General of the Interior Provinces of New Spain from 1785 to 1790, suggested as a device to foster better relations that the children of Comanche chiefs be sent to Mexico City to learn the Spanish language and culture. Anza founded the village of San Carlos de los Jupes in 1787 on the Arkansas River in Colorado[15] in an abortive attempt to establish an agricultural colony of Comanche. Artisans built houses and farmers were sent to teach the Comanche to farm, but they would not become good Pueblo Indians and the project soon failed. Anza's governorship marked the most tranquil period of Comanche-Spanish relations, and after 1800 they deteriorated rapidly.

As early as 1724 a French explorer,
[439] Bourgmont, had made contact with the Comanche in what is now Kansas. He observed that they had horses which they said

[113] [14] A. B. Thomas, The Plains Indians and New Mexico, p. 6 (Glendale, Calif., 1940).
[113] [15] J. E. Haley, The Comanchero Trade, Southwestern Historical Quarterly, 38:157-76 (1935).
[113] [16] A. B. Thomas, San Carlos: A Comanche Pueblo on the Arkansas River, 1787, Colorado Magazine, 6:79-91 (Denver, Colo., 1929).

11: Casagrande E,L-5 (1940) 1954
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175 had been procured from the Spanish. Peace-
648 ful trading relations were begun by the
439 Mallet brothers in 1739,[19] and a lively trade in which hides, horses and captives were exchanged for guns, powder, balls, knives, glass beads, mirrors, vermilion, axes, chocolate, and the like, soon sprang up. The Wichita and other Louisiana tribes as well as French traders were active participants in this commerce and contributed agricultural products. It seems probable that the French,
175 in addition to supplying the Comanche with
648 firearms, also incited them to attack the
[721] Spanish. The Comanche had long acted as a buffer between the French from Louisiana to the northeast and the Spanish to the southwest. Indeed, Anza had hoped to establish them as guardians of the northern frontier in the event of French ambitions to southwest expansion.

648 Contacts with the newly founded United States began shortly after the Louisiana
[439] Purchase in 1803. That year James Pursely, the first American to penetrate the new territory, spent a season trading with the Kiowa and Comanche,[20] and the first filibusters and freebooters soon followed.
101 Catlin's visit[21] to the Comanche with Colonel Dodge's expedition in 1834 found them at the height of their power—an estimated 30,000 strong and ranging from the Mandan villages in Dakota to the Rio
439 Grande and beyond. The earliest trading-
648 posts were established in 1834 and 1837 after Dodge's expedition had proven the friendly disposition of the Plains tribes. The first treaty between the United States and the Comanche and their allied tribes was negotiated in 1835. In 1846 the United States government agreed to provide for the establishment of trading houses and

[19] A. B. Thomas, The Plains Indians and New Mexico (Glendale, Calif., 1940).

[20] James Mooney, Calendar History of the Kiowa Indians, 17th Annual Report, BAE p. 171 (Washington, D. C., 1898).

[113] [21] George Catlin, Letters and Notes on the Manners, Customs and Condition of the North American Indians, 2 vols., (London, England, 1841).

agencies along the frontier, and to furnish blacksmiths to repair the Indians' arms and utensils.

The government early adopted the policy of passing out gifts, later institutionalized as annuities, at tribal gatherings when treaties were made in futile attempts to stem the harrowing raids of the Comanche and thus pave the way for White encroachment. The following is a representative list of goods distributed at a council in 1845:[33]

> 21 silk handkerchiefs, 3 cotton handkerchiefs, 4 cotton shawls, 8 pieces blue prints, 40½ yards blue and red strouding, 7¼ pieces blue drill, 75 pounds brass wire, 5 dozen tin pans, 13 tin buckets, 12 pounds vermilion, 12 dozen butcher knives, 1¼ dozen cocoa handles, 5 dozen horn combs, 8 dozen ivory combs, 2¼ dozen files, 7¼ M. brass tacks, 2 pounds linen thread, 1¼ dozen fire steels, 1¼ M. needles, 1¼ dozen looking glasses, 4¼ pounds indigo and verdigris, 2¼ dozen squaw hatchets, 4 dozen tin cups, 1¼ dozen pair red blankets, 7¼ dozen pair white blankets, 42 small bars lead, 12 large bars lead, 2 pieces unbleached domestic, 35 pounds powder.

Due both to impoverishment caused by the rapidly dwindling buffalo herds and to the pressure of White settlers, the Comanche became increasingly restive. Raiding, fighting with the United States Army and Texas volunteers, and the constant making and breaking of treaties characterised the years up to 1875 when the Comanche were finally rounded up and confined to the Fort Sill Reservation along with the Wichita, Kiowa, and Kiowa-Apache. Typical of the many treaties of the time was the one made at Medicine Lodge, Kansas, in 1867 when the government promised rations, an agency with a warehouse and a resident agent, physician, teacher, carpenter, blacksmith, farmer, miller, and engineer as employees. Through the years 1854–1859 many of the Texas Comanche had already been placed on a reservation where an unsuccessful attempt at farming and a settled life was made.

[33] R. N. Richardson, The Comanche Barrier to South Plains Settlement, p. 136 (Glendale, Calif., 1933).

657 The early reservation days were largely times of turmoil and discontent. Rations were often scant and inferior, schools and hospital facilities were inadequate, and epi-
657 demics were rife. Cattle-men from Texas
648 grazed their stock on reservation lands without payment or permission, and altercations between the Indians and U. S. troops were
657 frequent. In 1879 the agent, Hunt, instructed that each family should be located on a piece of land on which they were to remain, and no Indian was allowed to leave the reservation without military escort—an in-
648 junction that was often disobeyed. Long before the Territory was opened to the flood of White settlers in 1901 the influx of prospectors, squatters, farmers, missionaries, traders, gamblers, liquor peddlers, adventurers, and squaw-men had begun.

657 Sheep were issued in 1877 and 1878, but
231 there was no sale for the wool and, the Indians were said to have disliked them so much that the idea had to be given up.
241 Farming was begun in 1879, but the Indians'
492 teams were too weak to break the heavy
464 sod and the plowing had to be done by Whites who continued to be hired as farm-
361 ers. The first houses were built in 1877 and ten years later a number of churches were
136 erected. By 1880 the buffalo were gone and cattle had replaced them on the ranges.
434 "Grass money", paid by Texas cattle-men for grazing privileges, was instituted in 1885 and provided the chief source of
625 tribal income. The Indian police were or-
692 ganized in 1877 and in 1886 an Indian court was established and functioned until 1900.
657 Earlier, in 1872, the first of a series of joint delegations of reservation Indians went to Washington.

648 The ratification in 1900 of the "Jerome
657 Agreement" between the United States
178 government and the Apache, Kiowa, and Comanche Indians marked the end of reservation life and ushered in the modern
648 period. Under its articles the Indians ceded
423 their claims to the land formerly known as Indian Territory except one tract called "the Big Pasture", and each man, woman,

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648 423 and child was allotted 160 acres with sections set aside for schools and public institutions. The allotments were to be held in trust for 25 years after which time title was to go to the Indians unless the President extended the trust period. For relinquishing their rights the Indians were to receive two million dollars payable at some unspecified date in per capita payments of $500 each with 5 per cent interest paid annually. The lands were to be free from taxation and could not become subject to indebtedness during the trust period. Thus the Comanche became citizens under the allotment system and rations were withdrawn in 1901. Since these allotments were widely scattered and interspersed with White farms, the development of a tribal community was largely precluded and the process of acculturation thereby hastened.

423 [657] [641] [177] [621]

175 177 178 In summary, the history of Comanche contacts with Western culture shows an early period of vacillating hostile and friendly relations, largely tangential in nature, with the Spanish, French, and Americans which lasted until about the middle of the nineteenth century. That date marked the end of Comanche tribal autonomy and ushered in a period of rapid cultural change. Another fifty years may see the old Comanche culture pass into the legendary as it already has for most of the younger persons today.

177 178

197 **3.0.** The Comanche language is a member of the far-flung Uto-Aztecan stock first set forth by Buschmann[53] and further delineated by Kroeber,[54] Sapir,[55] and Whorf.[56] Sapir

[113] [53] Johann C. Buschmann, Spurend der Aztekischen Sprache im Norden, Abhandlungen der koeniglichen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin aus dem Jahre 1854 (Berlin, Germany, 1859).

[113] [54] A. L. Kroeber, Shoshonean Dialects of California, UCPAAE, 4.65-165 (Berkeley, Calif., 1907), and Uto-Aztecan Languages of Mexico, Ibero-Americana, No. 8 (Berkeley, Calif., 1934).

[113] [55] Edward Sapir, Southern Paiute and Nahuatl, a Study in Uto-Aztecan, Part I, JEAP, n.s., 10. 379-425; Part II, AA 17.96-120, 306-28 (1915), and continued in JEAP 11.443-88 (1914), (begun in 1913).

[p. 145-A]

192 552 kaiwanĭ· *Kiowa* (-nĭ· may be translated as *people*); karó· *Caddo;* cikshó·nĭ· *Chickasaw;* sikapo? *Kickapoo;* siminó·? *Seminole;* so-soni? *Shoshone;* navó· *Navaho;* yu·ta? *Ute, Paiute.*

In contrast to the above a number of tribal names are descriptive: ?a?a·nĭ· *Crow (horned people);* ?eshkwita? *Mescalero Apache (grey feces);* papicimina? *Sioux (head unjointed);* ta·si?nĭ· *Kiowa-Apache (spotted people* (from small-pox); saritihka? *Arapaho (dog eaters);* sianavo· *Cheyenne (feather striped* from their arrows).

197 648 Early and brief French contacts have left no apparent trace on Comanche. And in spite of the wide and relatively frequent relations, both friendly and hostile, between the Comanche and other tribes of the Plains and the Southwest, only a few loanwords from other American Indian languages seem to have been taken into Comanche, and those noted are of doubtful origin. This may in part be attributed to the wide-spread use of the sign language and to what seems to have been a rather large amount of multilingualism among the Plains tribes.[99] It seems especially noteworthy that the Kiowa, who lived in close association with the Comanche since the close of the 18th century,[100] had so little direct effect on the Comanche language. One word, ?aho *thank you,* seems to have been borrowed from Kiowa.

197 198 197 [192]

601 192 197 The kinship term, haipia, which refers to siblings-in-law of the opposite sex between whom the typical Plains reciprocal joking relationship obtained may, as Gladwin suggests,[101] have been borrowed along with

[99] James Mooney, Calendar History of the Kiowa Indians, 17th Annual Report, BAE p. 156 (Washington, D. C.; 1898), mentions that Kiowa children were often left with the Crow for 2-3 years to learn the language and thus preserve old friendships.

[100] James Mooney, Calendar History of the Kiowa Indians, 17th Annual Report, BAE p. 163 (Washington, D. C.; 1898).

[113] [101] Thomas Gladwin, Comanche Kin Behavior, AA 50: 73-94, p. 81 (1948).

[p. 231-A]

11: Casagrande E,L-5 (1940) 1954
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192 197 synonyms for English loans. Moreover, several English loans such as cheese and wagon have displaced older descriptive terms which are now obsolescent.

From an inspection of the Spanish list it is apparent that it is composed almost entirely of words for such basic and tangible things as foods, implements, domesticated animals and clothing, and from this, even if historical records were lacking, one could assume that contact with the Spanish was tangential. The English list is fundamentally the same in content, and it is possible that it paralleled the Spanish list more closely a decade or two ago, but there is the addition of words pertaining to the church, administration, and a money economy. It seems evident from the linguistic data that Comanche contacts with these facets of Western culture were made primarily through the Americans, and again the historical record confirms us in this.

●648 The Comanche, along with many other nomadic or semi-nomadic groups, as compared with the more sedentary tribes of the Southwest, were peripheral to the sphere of influence of the administrators and missionaries of Colonial Spain, or more effectively resisted their overtures, and were relatively isolated from American influences until the late nineteenth century.

000 This is reflected in the degree to which Spanish loanwords have been accepted by the Indian languages of Mexico and the southwestern United States.[109] Navaho has borrowed 32 words from Spanish,[110] Chiricahua Apache 19,[111] Comanche 17, and Southern Paiute 6.[112] Nahuatl, on the other

[109] The estimates given below can only be approximate, but they may be taken as representative.

[113] [110] Franciscan Fathers, An Ethnologic Dictionary of the Navaho Language, (St. Michaels, Arizona; 1910).

[113] [111] Harry Hoijer, Chiricahua Loan-Words from Spanish, Lg 15: 110-115 (1939).

[112] Edward Sapir, Southern Paiute Dictionary, Proc. of the Amer. Academy of Arts and Sciences, 65: 537-730 (Philadelphia, Pa.; 1931).

[p. 233-A]

198 stated, is probably that the conditions under which these forms of speech flourish were absent. A relatively stabilised tangential relationship between a dominant and subordinate people as between master and slave or servant, missionary and convert, or trader and native seems necessary for the formation of a pidgin or creolized language. Such a relationship never held between the Comanche and Whites for any length of time and no true pidgin ever developed.

197 Comanche is a dying language. It is being steadily eclipsed by English which today has a new and relentless prestige. Another 50 to 75 years may see Comanche cease to function as a living language. The constant contact with Whites, the teaching of English in the schools and, due to the fact that the Comanche live on scattered allotments, the lack of an integrated community or tribal life comparable to that of the Pueblo or Reservation tribes, are all factors in the evanescence of the language. English is the language of the dominant culture, the language through which one gets on in the world by means of widening social, economic and political contacts. Though it is doomed, the language is far and away the most vitally functioning part that remains of the old Comanche culture. Other traits are gone, empty and broken forms, or compromises with the new. Comanche today affords ample evidence of the flexibility and tenacity of language in the face of pressure from a dominant culture.

121 6.0. Personal names, along with kinship terminology,[148] represent a segment of culture where custom and language are virtually inseparable, and it seems especially appropriate in a study of linguistic acculturation to describe the effects of contacts with Western culture on Comanche personal names. To provide a basis for comparison between the old and new practices,

[148] Thomas Gladwin, Comanche Kin Behavior, AA 50: 73-94 (1948) discusses Comanche kinship terms.

[p. 243-A]

13: Simmons H-4 (no date) 1967 NO6 Comanche NO6
(1785-1819) New Mexico

Introduction

OVER three quarters of a century after their final defeat on the plains of Texas, the Comanches continue to excite the interest and imagination of Western history students. This may be attributed, at least in part, to the Comanches' ferocity in battle and to their superb horsemanship, for which they were justly famous. "To fight and ride like a Comanche," was a popular saying on the frontier. But the fame of these Indians, among those who knew them at the height of their glory, rested also on the fact that Comanches were generally regarded as possessing qualities superior to those of other nomadic tribes.

In the late eighteenth century, the Spaniards of New Mexico who had been victims of Comanche raids for decades cultivated an alliance with the tribe against the common Apache foe. The Comanche's fighting abilities and his habit of keeping agreements convinced the Spanish authorities of the usefulness of establishing a permanent peace.

The distinguished colonial citizen, Pedro Bautista Pino, reported of the Comanches in 1812, that "they fulfill with the greatest care all the conditions of treaties; so that we also try to observe all stipulations therein in order not to offend them." Then he added that the Spaniards viewed these people as graceful in appearance, modest in dress and air, industrious, and in general possessing other commendable traits.

James 175
Mooney estimates that in 1690 they numbered no 101
more than 1,600 souls.[3] [161]

To the south resided the Utes, who may be re- [197]
garded as linguistic cousins of the Comanches since
they also spoke the Shoshonean language. The Utes 175
occupied the San Luis Valley in Southern Colorado,
and from this vantage point they maintained close
contact with the Spanish and with the Pueblos and
Navajos in New Mexico. From the Utes, the Co-
manches must have first learned of these peoples,
and from them too, they may have acquired their
first horses.

By 1700 or earlier, the Comanches had begun to
shift their camps southward and eastward. No
doubt, they were drawn by the possibility of obtain-
ing mounts, but at the same time they may have
been starting to feel pressure from stronger tribes to
the north, particularly the Blackfoot and Crow. An
added attraction to the south and east were the
plains teeming with buffalo and antelope.

The first Comanches drifting southward joined Ute 175
parties who were accustomed to trade in the Spanish 648
settlements and the large Indian pueblos of Taos
and Picuris. Thus were the rustics from the northern
wilderness introduced to the material refinements of
more advanced peoples. Surely the whites would 175
have shuddered could they have envisioned the cen- 721
tury and a half of bloody warfare that was to follow 648
upon the Comanche entry into the Southwest.

The first persons against whom the Comanches
displayed their prowess in war were the Apaches
who roamed the hills and plains northeast of Taos.
As early as 1706, a combined Comanche-Ute raiding

175 party struck at Apache rancherias above present
721 Trinidad, Colorado. This event was the opening
648 curtain on several decades of intense hostility between the Comanches and the Plains Apaches. By
175 1733 the continual hammering of the mountain Indians had caused Apache power to crumble in a wide swath of country extending from eastern Colorado to Central Kansas.

Remnants of the defeated tribes fled to the security of settlements in New Mexico where in this same year, a mission for 130 refugees was established by the Spanish near Taos. Some of the defeated Plains Apaches, however, were unwilling to submit to the discipline of Christianity, and as an alternative they fled south, out of range of the Comanches who would exterminate them and the Spaniards who would civilize them.

175 By 1715 the government authorities in Santa Fe
648 had begun to pay heed to the growing danger posed by the Comanches. The Spaniards had not fully realized at this early date that the Apaches of the plains were being displaced by an even more aggres-
175 sive foe. This point was driven forcefully home,
648 however, when the Comanches with their Ute allies
721 assaulted the Taos district in 1716. Other severe raids followed each year thereafter, until the Spanish governor personally led a punitive expedition northward to the vicinity of the Arkansas River in the autumn of 1719. No hostile Indians were encountered, but it was definitely established that the Comanches had filtered through the passes in the Front Range and had occupied much of the valuable buffalo country formerly held by the Apaches.

Comanche attacks against the New Mexican settlements continued, but at the same time the Indians were developing a new interest in trade. Their activities on the plains had netted them considerable surplus wealth in hides, jerked meat, Apache and Pawnee slaves, and horses.

The logical outlets for these were the trading fairs held annually in the pueblos of Taos and Pecos. The fairs occurred in September when the farming Indians had the fruits of their fields to offer for barter, and making the events even more attractive were the growing numbers of Spanish goods which were finding their way into the market place. The Comanches thus found it convenient to suspend hostilities for the weeks that the trading was in progress and to enter the pueblos under a flag of truce. Such an arrangement was acceptable to the Spaniards since they looked upon the fairs as providing a useful opportunity to try to convince their enemy to accept a year around peace.

The friendly but brief contacts which the Comanches had with the New Mexicans at the fairs in no way, however, deterred them from undertaking raids against the settlements at other seasons of the year. These became particularly devastating in the decades following 1750, as the Comanches extended the range of their attacks into the central and southern portions of the province. By mid-century the Comanches had broken the alliance with their old friends the Utes and in pushing that tribe back into the mountains, they became for the time being the dominant people on the southern Plains.

The Comanche threat to New Mexico became tru-

175 ly alarming as suggested by a report of 1751 which
721 claimed 500 Pueblo Indians and Spanish colonists
648 had been massacred up to that date. When the In-
727 dians numbering several hundred fell on Pecos Pueblo in the summer of this same year, the Spaniards organized a pursuit force and retaliated by surprising the Comanches in their camp, killing 101, and taking the remainder prisoner. Although victories such
175 as this were uncommon, the New Mexican colonists,
721 having realized the gravity of their problems, were
648 more willing to tighten their defenses and join with protective or punitive expeditions at a moment's notice.

Unfortunately, the stiffened resistance merely sharpened the challenge for the Comanche warrior who thrived on danger. So, far from diminishing, the Indian offenses against New Mexico continued
175 to increase in number and severity. In 1774, for ex-
701 ample, almost a thousand warriors devastated the
[648] Tewa district north of Santa Fe. If this figure for
[721] their fighting force is accurate, it strongly suggests
[161] that the Comanches, since moving onto the plains and adapting to horse culture and buffalo hunting, had experienced something of a population explosion. At the end of the century, General Pedro de Nava estimated 2,000 warriors for the Eastern Comanches and 4,000 for the Western.

175 The Spaniards won minor victories now and then,
648 but by the 1770's the Comanches had acquired fire-
[721] arms in quantity so that they were an even more
411 formidable enemy. Nevertheless Governor Juan
[728] Bautista de Anza in 1785 succeeded in summoning a peace council composed of the leading chiefs of

the several Comanche bands which resided on the the eastern limits of New Mexico. 175 648 728

Anza was aided in his task by the immense prestige he enjoyed among the Indians. His reputation he owed to the destruction of a large Comanche camp in southeastern Colorado in 1779 and to the slaying at the same time of the prominent war chief Cuerno Verde. Governor Anza, in fact, succeeded in establishing peace with the Comanches by February of 1786 and at the same time in enlisting their aid in the continuing struggle with hostile Apaches in the south.

At the peace gathering were represented the principal bands of the Western Comanches, including the Yamparikas, and Yupes or Jupes, who were probably identical with the group known later as the Kwaharis. Some members of another band, the Kotsotekas, often called Cuchanticas or Cuchanecs, were also present. The Spaniards themselves during the last quarter of the eighteenth century were uncertain as to the divisions within the tribe. For example, the authorities in Texas usually considered the Kotsotekas as Eastern Comanches (*Orientales*) along with the Penatekas or Honey-Eaters (known to the Anglo-Americans later as the Wasp Band). 175 648 728 101 175 101

The Western Comanches, who agreed to terminate hostilities against the Spanish, followed a suggestion of Governor Anza and selected one of their number, Ecueracapa or Leather Jacket, to serve as head chief with authority to speak for the tribe. To increase his stature, the Spaniards bestowed upon Ecueracapa the lofty title of "General of the Comanche Nation." As a further inducement to remain at peace, 175 728 648 [643] [431]

175
648 the Spanish government through the viceroy in
728 Mexico City authorized an annual distribution of
[431] gifts to the Comanches to be paid for by a special fund created for that purpose.

There were, in truth, a number of cogent reasons why the warlike Comanches were willing to accept Anza's offer of peace in 1786, quite apart from the
[721] elaborate gifts which were to be forthcoming. In the first place, their raids against New Mexico in the 1770's had proved so devastating that the impoverished province, at least for the time being, had little
[164] to offer them. Moreover, a severe smallpox epidemic that had visited most of western North America in 1780-1781 had taken its toll among the Comanches, leaving the tribe greatly weakened for a number of years thereafter. Finally, the Comanches were continuing their drift toward the south and east so that the focus of their attention was moving away from New Mexico and toward the settlements of Texas, Coahuila, and Chihuahua.

Not so understandable is why the Eastern Comanches or Orientales were led to accept peace terms at about the same time as their kinsmen to the west. Apparently, the overriding consideration in this case was the hatred felt toward the Lipan Apaches, against whom the Orientales now joined with the Spanish in common cause. [See Document I].

The peace established in 1785-1786 with both the Eastern and Western Comanches relieved the settled frontier of serious attacks from this tribe for almost a generation and was one of the few notable achievements registered by Spain in her dealings with the Indians of the northern frontier during the eight-

14 [See Category 175, pp. 21-22--Analyst.]

eenth century. Although the Comanches resumed their attacks on the upper Rio Grande Valley in the following century, these were never as damaging as the blows which had fallen on the province in the years immediately prior to the treaties.

After independence from Spain, when New Mexico was a remote province of the Mexican Republic, the intensity of Comanche incursions increased somewhat—Pecos Pueblo was reduced to utter ruin by 1838—but on the whole the raiders concentrated more heavily on the towns and villages of northern Mexico.

Comanches, traveling in parties as large as 500 and fully organized under their own officers, annually laid waste entire districts as far south as Fresnillo and Zacatecas. A well-defined road appeared—the Great Comanche War Trail—which led from the high plains of Texas across the Big Bend of the Río Grande to strike at the mining communities and haciendas from Durango southward, and according to some reports, as far west as the Gulf of California.

The anxious citizens kept lookouts constantly in the field to give warning of the Comanche approach. Once the alarm had been sounded, settlers, and peones with their families fled to the security of strongly fortified haciendas in somewhat the same manner as the peasants of medieval Europe must have sought refuge in castles from warrior Vikings.

Rather strong evidence suggests that the Comanches during several decades of friendly contact with the Spaniards in New Mexico through observation had learned much concerning the European military system and tactics and had adapted these to their own service.

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175 own service. It is known, for example, that the Co-
manches on raiding the plains of Durango, more
648 than once defeated Mexican troops in pitched
726 battles.

175 Riding down from the north in good order, the
701 Indians were organized under their own "generals"
177 and "captains" and in a number of cases even wore
articles of Spanish military apparel, gifts, no doubt,
175 of the authorities in Santa Fe. The entire question
of Comanche military organization during this period
is an intriguing one and deserves more study.

The details of Comanche history from 1820 to 1879, the period of conflict with the Anglo-Americans, are familiar to historians. From the accounts of Santa Fe traders, frontiersmen and scouts, and soldiers who fought in the last wars on the southern plains have come down to us a fairly sharp picture of the final days of the Comanche nation.

By contrast, the movements and activities of this great Indian tribe in the century and a quarter after 1700 remains, in considerable measure, a mystery. Some of what is known has been sketched above. A great deal more information, however, lies hidden in colonial documents, awaiting discovery by researchers. A start has been made, notably by Alfred B. Thomas, but much remains to be done.

The seven documents translated herein each throw small rays of light on obscure phases of Comanche history, providing clues to the tribe's relation both with the Spaniards and with neighboring Indian groups. Of particular interest is the summary of the treaty arranged with the Eastern Comanches in 1785

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[Document I]. Writers, in lauding the accomplishment of Governor Anza in bringing the Western Comanches to terms, have often neglected the fact that a similar peace was also made with the Orientales. 175

The treaty translated below was included in a general report on Indian affairs made by Pedro de Nava, Commandant General of the Interior Provinces (1792-1800) to the Viceroy of New Spain, Miguel Joseph de Azanza. As Nava notes, harmony between Spanish citizens and the Comanches had been maintained up to the time of his writing (1799) with a few minor exceptions. [648]

Originals of Documents I and II rest in the Provincias Internas section of the Archivo General de la Nación (AGN), Mexico City. Photocopies of these are available in the Coronado Room of the University of New Mexico Library. The remaining five documents are found in the Spanish Archives of New Mexico, State Records Center and Archives, Santa Fe. 113

—Mare Simmons

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Document One

TREATY WITH THE EASTERN COMANCHES, October, 1785, from the report of Pedro de Nava Commandant General of the Interior Provinces, Chihuahua, July 23, 1799.

THE COMANCHES are divided in three branches or tribes known by the names Jupe, Yamparicas, and Cuchanec, or Cuchihantica. The first two inhabit the frontier of New Mexico, and the third, that of Texas. At almost the same time, peace was arranged in both Provinces with this numerous and warlike nation; and the terms settled upon in October of 1785 with the eastern tribe were the following:

1st That hostilities should cease on both sides, and that in whatever place Spaniards and Comanches might meet, they should treat each other as brothers and good friends.

2nd That the preceding condition is understood to apply not only to the inhabitants of Texas but to all the vassals of the King.

3rd That they should return our captives which they took for ransom, ceasing to engage in such acts against any nation.

4th That they should not admit into their camps any strangers, unless they suppose them to be traders who provide them with merchandise in exchange for hides.

[1785-1799]

175 5th That they should be friends and enemies to those
648 who are ours.
728 6th That they should declare as their enemies, the Lipan Apaches and that whenever the Comanches attack them, some of them should come to [San Antonio de] Bexar to advise us of the results.

7th That they should request the license of the Governor of Texas when they intend to transfer themselves to the frontier of the Province of Coahuila for the purpose of making war on the Lipan Apaches and the Mescaleros.

8th And that each year a gift should be given to the captains and Indian leaders of the Comanches as a proof and as a manifestation of our good friendship.

Some of the Eastern Comanches have broken away from the main group and have created small disorders and have perpetrated robberies, but without the knowledge of the captains or other Indian leaders of that nation, who themselves have continued to observe in an acceptable manner the conditions of peace since the time of the agreement.

Pedro de Nava

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Document Two

REPORT OF THE COMMANDANT GENERAL of the Western Interior Provinces, Jacobo Ugarte y Loyola, to the Viceroy of New Spain, Manuel Antonio Flórez, on the importance of maintaining peace with the Comanches, and campaigns which they have executed against the Apaches, March 13, 1788.

SINCE the Comanche Nation made peace with us, its members have undertaken on their own initiative various campaigns against the Apaches, in addition to supplying us voluntarily with units of warriors who have joined our expeditions in New Mexico. 175 648 721

On one expedition which they carried out last July with 95 men commanded by one of their captains called Ysampami, they managed to kill five Faraon Apaches, making prisoner 35 individuals of both sexes and of all ages, according to a declaration made in a message from the General of the [Comanche] Nation to the Governor of the Province [of New Mexico], Dn Juan Bautista de Anza. The original copy of this report is being sent to Your Excellency. 175 648 727 701 175 648

There is no doubt that these Indian warriors will launch other campaigns against the barbarians who are their implacable foes. I have advised the pres-

175 ent Governor [of New Mexico] Dn Fernando de la
● 648 Concha to compile a careful and exact record of their operations and successes and to pass this information on to me so that I may inform Your Excellency of all developments.

By these documents and by the facts referred to in various reports which I have sent to Your Excellency, ample demonstration has been provided for the usefulness of the system developed for the destruction of the Apaches who are now caught between two frontiers [those of New Mexico and Texas]. And since these borders are free from the attacks of other enemies, [the settlers] may devote their arms and energies to the principal objective of subduing the
000 Apaches. And if by good fortune it should come about that the Mescaleros in the north should be kept at peace, at least for a little while, I feel certain the Province [of New Mexico] would shortly experience the favorable effects toward which my orders made in the field and at the Presidio [of Janos] have been directed. And my future orders will provide for whatever else may be necessary along this line. With regard to new developments, I will keep Your Excellency informed from Chihuahua.

May God keep Your Excellency many years

Janos, 13 of March of 1788

His Lordship Jacobo Ugarte y Loyola

[To] His Lordship
d. Manuel Antonio Florez

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Document Three

FERNANDO DE LA CONCHA TO THE VICE-roy Conde de Revilla Gigedo, Santa Fe, May 6, 1793, regarding inter-tribal warfare between the Comanches and other Indians.

THE FOUR nations of the Comanches, Utes, Navajos, and Jicarillas who have allied themselves with this Province [of New Mexico] continue without change their good conduct and they remain in harmony with the local settlers. But among themselves they still launch raids, and this stems primarily from the hate which the latter tribes feel for the first.

At the beginning of last winter, the Utes and Navajos got together for a council and they resolved to go and attack the Comanches. They set out immediately and soon encountered a rancheria left unguarded by [Comanche] men who had gone buffalo hunting. They proceeded with little difficulty to destroy it completely, capturing and killing the women and children, and running off the horseherd that was there. When news of this reached the other Comanches, they swore to avenge the offense and raising a considerable war party, they attacked the village of the Utes in a like manner and completely destroyed one of their rancherias, with the result that both [tribes] have suffered almost equal harm from the other.

000 [1793]

175 from the other. These acts have been committed
648 outside the Province [of New Mexico].

More regrettable are the consequences which the Province may suffer if the Comanches are not restrained in the just anger which they feel toward the Navajos, because to search out and attack them in their haunts, [the Comanches] will be forced to pass through the center of New Mexico, thus disrupting the tranquil state which has been maintained up to this time.

To try and guard against further harm which may originate [from this situation], since first receiving news of these developments, I have worked constantly to the present day endeavoring through use of means which seem to me most reasonable to bring about a conciliation between the two Nations,[3] all of which must be managed with considerable tact and prudence,

To succeed in this important objective, I have ordered the Navajos through their general, who is a subject with admirable qualities, to gather together all the captives of the Comanche Nation which may be in their power, and that accompanied by the same general and the captains of his retinue, they should conduct [the prisoners] to this Villa [of Santa Fe] to hand them over and to give complete satisfaction to the Comanche general and captains when they reach here.

This same order I have communicated to the Comanches and as a result they have not made any move against the Navajos up to this moment. As soon as they arrive here, as I've already told them, I will notify [the Navajos] who are nearby and I will

take personal charge of the negotiations. Whatever comes of the meeting between the two Nations, I will advise Your Excellency at the first opportunity. 175 648

The Apaches who are at peace at the Puesto de Sabinal asked my license on April 3 to go and collect and prepare mescal which they annually store up. I gave them permission with the express condition that they return by the first of this month to do their accustomed planting. I still have not received word of their return from that place, which is forty leagues from this capital, but I expect it momentarily. 000

May God Keep You,

6 of May of 1793

[Fernando de la Concha]

[To]
His Excellency Conde de Revilla Cigedo

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Document Four

COMMANDANT GENERAL PEDRO DE NAVA to Governor Fernando de la Concha, Chihuahua, August 8, 1793.

I SEE with satisfaction by the official letter from Your Lordship of last July 25, that friendship and good harmony between the allied [Indian] nations and that Province [of New Mexico] continues, and that the Apaches have made new overtures for peace at Sabinal. To continue, the other news of which your Lordship advises me, I find most regrettable: that concerning the campaign carried out by the Comanches against the Pawnees which resulted in the loss of the [Comanche] Captain Hachaxas, and grave wounds for General Ecueracapa.

The measures which Your Lordship took in dispatching what medical aid was available to the [wounded general] seem to me appropriate. And I await further details which Your Lordship may acquire concerning the encounter between those two Nations, as well as news of the results of the settlement of the Apaches at Sabinal.

May God guard Your Lordship many years.

Chihuahua August 8, 1793 Pedro de Nava

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Document Five

COMMANDANT GENERAL PEDRO DE NAVA
To Governor Fernando de la Concha
Chihuahua, December 31, 1793

I Have received the official letter from Your Lordship numbered 449 of the 19th of November in which you advised me of the impending march to attend the council which the Comanche Indians had called to meet along the Colorado River for the purpose of naming a general to replace the deceased Ecueracapa. And I received the later letter numbered 458 in which Your Lordship informs me that the election by universal approbation of the assembled rancherias fell on Captain Encanaguané, whose suitability leaves nothing to be desired, according to what Your Lordship says. 175 643 [666]

I approve all Your Lordship has done on this occasion, of that which I have been informed; and [I am also pleased] with the deference accorded Your Lordship by the Comanche Nation and the respect which you showed their new leader, and the other Indians in line who came to the council. 175 648

May God guard Your Lordship many years.

Chihuahua December 31, 1793

Pedro de Nava

Señor Fernando de la Concha

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Document Six

REPORT ON COMANCHE AFFAIRS BY THE Governor of New Mexico, Joaquin Real Alencaster, Santa Fe, November 20, 1805, to the Commandant General of the Interior Provinces.

I AM NOTIFYING Your Excellency that three captains of the Yamparika Comanches who formerly lived to the north but now are found along the Rio Colorado [Canadian River], have presented themselves before me, requesting four favors, the nature of which are here explained; First that I should name as generals one of their captains called Somiquaso, and another from among the Cuchanticas called Quegue so that they would have leaders.

Second, that I should clothe them and present them gifts;

Third, that citizens from this Province should go and build them houses of wood forming a plaza along the aforementioned Rio Colorado near that of the Conchas. They agree to maintain the laborers and repay them with goods for their work;

And fourth, that I should set free certain prisoners and criminals.

I agreed to appoint the general whom they had requested and he took the name Carlos. I gave them

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648 clothes and gifts and offered to send workers to con-
[431] struct their houses if they would return for them in the spring. I denied them their fourth request.

Also, they asked that some should come at the first
175 of next [year] to barter for the small number of hides
648 which they had. In so far as it shall be convenient I
439 offered to let a few [people] go and carry on trade.
[643] On giving the staff of office (*bastón*) to the [Comanche] general, I had him give his word that they would come every year to trade and I promised him justice in the exchange of [their] goods for [those of our] goods which were desired, saying that this was
175 a good way to avoid unpleasantness. With all of this
648 they went away quite content, including the women and others who had accompanied them.

These Comanches were commanded for a long time by an Indian who was very loyal to this Province and who was known as Malla (Iron Jacket). All of the above I call to the attention of Your Excellency, hoping that it merits your approval.

May God keep you. Santa Fe, 20 of November of 1805.

J. R. A. [to the] Commandant General of the Internal Provinces

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Document Seven

INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE COMMANDANT General of the Western Interior Provinces, Alexo García Conde, to Facundo Melgares, Governor of New Mexico, with regard to punishment of the hostile tribes of the East, May 11, 1819.

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AS A RESULT of the hostilities perpetrated in the Provinces of the East [Texas and Coahuila] by the Comanches, Taguacanas [Tawakonis], Taguayaces [Taovayas], and Lipan [Apaches], the Commandant General of the East has initiated a campaign to search out and punish those Indians who can be found in their rancherías. It is to be feared, therefore, that as a result of such operations some of said Indians will flee by way of the outpost of Presidio del Norte [Ojinaga] with the intention of committing hostilities in this province [New Mexico]. To prevent such an occurrence, I have resolved to dispatch from the said outpost, the 20th of next June a unit of 255 men who for a period of 60 days will scout the territory as far as the right bank of the Pecos River.

As a consequence and by virtue of what I have advised the commander of the expedition, Dn Juan Francisco Granados, and so as not to stir up the Western Comanches on the frontier of this province who are observing the peace, you should exercise all

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648 possible care in avoiding any attack on their rancherias. It should prove useful if you would summon the principal leader of those Indians and make clear to him our plans and our intention to observe good faith with his people. In addition, be sure it is understood that the operations of the troops of this province are directed only toward punishing the Eastern Comanches who threaten us with raids. And explain that in view of all this, it would be well if members of the Western Nation would stay away from the territory where the campaign is in progress so that our troops will not attack them by mistake.

May God Guard Your Excellency

Durango, 11 of May, 1819

Alexo García Conde

To the Interim Governor
of New Mexico
[Facundo Melgares]

000 elsewhere after the battle.

101 Other tribes were in the area at the time. From the time of Fort Sill's establishment, the Comanche, Kiowa, and Kiowa-Apache were all encamped at the fort; the Arapaho and some Cheyenne were nearby and visited the area. In addition, from 1894 to 1913 a number of Apaches were kept at the post as prisoners of war. They were settled in scattered villages on the post until their release; several of these
172 villages were located near The Jared site. It is
764 unlikely that the Jared site is an Apache burial,
however, since burials of the Apaches who died
171 at Fort Sill were made in cemeteries rather than in isolated places and the locations of these cemeteries are known. It is also unlikely that the burial is Kiowa-Apache for although Opler and Bittle state that rocky crevices were preferred burial sites they also point out that burials were not placed in situations where they would be subject to exposure by erosion (Opler and Bittle 1961:384).

764 In an anthropological survey of the Comanches (Wallace and Hoebel 1952:150) there is further substantiation of ravine burials: again they are simple graves in the head of a canyon, crevice, or deep wash and contain "... articles of immediate personal usage belonging to the deceased ..." (Wallace and Hoebel 1952:152).

764 In the Southern Plains only the Cheyenne vie
171 for comparison with the Comanche as regards the custom of ravine or crevice burials: bodies of some of their dead were placed "... in caves or crevices in the rocks ..." (Grinnell 1962:163). Llewellyn and Hoebel likewise record crevice burials for the Cheyenne (1941:213).

[124] Several Kiowas and Comanches were asked about burials like the Jared site; there was total agreement among all that the Kiowa would not place a body in a ravine or crevice but would bury only in an open area. Both the Kiowas and the Comanches were aware of Comanche burials similar to the Jared site. Dodge, then, apparently was describing a practice with very limited distribution; only the Comanche and Cheyenne are known to have made ravine burials.

172 *Dating:* Since the artifacts from the Jared site have not been satisfactorily dated, I will comment on the history of the area, pointing to factors that may more narrowly delimit the date of interment.

648 The Comanches had long been in frequent
175 contact with American, French, and Mexican traders, explorers, and military expeditions be-

fore Fort Sill was founded in 1869. In fact Catlin, along with Dodge and a regiment of U. S. Dragoons, visited one of their large camps just a few miles from the Jared site in 1834 (Catlin 1841:61ff.). From these explorers and others who passed through their territory, and from their own trading and raiding expeditions, the Comanches received articles of white manufacture.

Fort Sill was established as a base of operations for subduing the Southern Plains Indians, and the U. S. Army made efforts to induce the Indians to settle permanently near the post. This program was achieved in part by giving food, clothing, and supplies to the Indians. By 1875 the Comanches were settled in the area and roamed no more except for a few small raids that continued until 1878.

The first Comanche cemetery was not established until 1889 or 1890 at Fort Sill (Gillett Griswold, personal communication), and with the exception of the post's cemetery where a few Indian Scouts were buried, and several mission cemeteries, this was the first established Comanche burial ground. Other Comanche cemeteries were opened shortly thereafter, and most burials were made in cemeteries after the early 1890's.

The literary and historic records help substantiate the identification of the Jared site as a Comanche burial probably dating after 1869 and before 1890 with the vague possibility of its being a Cheyenne burial. Kiowa and Comanche informants support this conclusion. No other groups in the area have been reported to have buried their dead in the manner noted at the Jared site.

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1841 *The Manners, Customs, and Condition of the North American Indians.* Published by the Author, at the Egyptian Hall, Piccadilly, London.

Dodge, R. I.
1882 *Our Wild Indians: Thirty-three Years' Personal Experience Among the Red Men of the Great West.* A. D. Worthington and Co., Hartford.

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20: Wallace H-4,5 (1945) 1953 NO6 Comanche NO6

105 no permanent villages. The horse provided means for rapid and relatively easy transportation across the vast expanses and, as a medium of exchange, it was a tangible form of capital wealth.

177 But the Comanches were over-powered eventually by the Americans. Americans crossed the Comanche hunting grounds on their way to Santa Fe and California frequently after 1846 and spread diseases that ravaged the Comanches more disastrously than the bullets from the guns of the soldiers and pioneers. The six-shooter proved to be for mounted men a superior weapon to the Indian bow and arrow. The iron horse moved across the prairies with a speed and an endurance that set at naught that of the Indian pony, bringing swarms of hunters, settlers, and soldiers into the Comanche hunting grounds. The hunters with a new, superior rifle began a reckless slaughter of the buffalo, and without the buffalo the Comanches could not possibly continue their old way of life. Armed cowboys drove their herds of hardy longhorn cattle farther and farther west to graze the nutritious grasses of the buffalo range until they were ready to trade in Abilene or in Dodge City for Yankee dollars. After the Civil War the government was in position to undertake vigorous military action.

618 657 These factors brought the United States government and the Comanches together in a peace council. By the Treaty of Medicine Lodge in 1867 the Comanches and their allies, the Kiowas and the Kiowa-Apaches, were assigned a reservation of almost three million acres in Southwestern Oklahoma. [13] The reservation was bounded on the east by the ninety-eighth meridian, on the north by the Washita River to a point thirty miles above Fort Cobb and thence by a line due west to the North Fork of Red River, and on the south and west by the Red River and its North Fork. The treaty permitted the United States to construct railroads, roads, military posts, schools, and an agency—none of which the Comanches wanted. The government for its part agreed to provide annuity goods for a period of thirty years while the Indians were making the transition to an agricultural econ-

20: Wallace H-4,5 (1945) 1953 NO6 Comanche NO6

omy.[1] Probably one-third of the Comanches refused to sign the treaty and accept reservation life. But after the failure of the Quaker Peace Policy, the government embarked upon an aggressive military campaign that resulted in the total defeat of the Comanches in the early autumn of 1874.

The Comanches began life on the reservation politically, economically, socially, and spiritually bankrupt. Traditional culture patterns were no longer applicable. The chiefs could no longer maintain control. Without opportunity to hunt and to raid there was no means by which the men could attain social rank and prestige; the social system was frozen. Religious and moral concepts seemed valueless; their medicine had failed them. The buffalo were quickly slaughtered, leaving the Comanches without a source of supplying themselves with food, clothing, shelter, or other necessities.

The Comanches were expected to pass within the span of a single lifetime from the age of stone to that of steam. They were to accept the white man's language, his legal and moral codes, his religion, his food, his clothing. They were to build houses, schools, and churches, to purchase farm equipment and livestock, to improve their allotments, and learn to farm. It was a big assignment. Obviously, considerable capital was necessary for significant progress.

The cultural change was too rapid and too great for simple solution. For some there was no problem; they simply refused to take the white man's road and in an effort to resurrect the past, tried the sun dance, the ghost dance, and peyote—all in vain. A few farsighted individuals had realized from the first that there was no alternative for the white man's road. Reluctantly, the disillusioned began to take it. Favorable economic conditions made the transition easier.

Meanwhile, land hungry "Boomers" made stronger and stronger demands on the government to open the reservation. They argued that the lands were not being used. One

1. Charles J. Kappler (comp.), Indian Affairs, Laws and Treaties, 57 Cong., 1 sess., Sen. Doc. 452 (5 Vols.; Washington, 1903), II, 977 ff.

20: Wallace H-4,5 (1945) 1953 NO6 Comanche NO6

by one the chiefs were won over, and in 1892 a group of them signed the Jerome Agreement. The agreement provided for an allotment of 160 acres of land to each Indian, for a common tribal reserve of approximately one-half million acres, and for the opening of the remainder of the reservation to white settlers. The assignment of allotments was completed in 1901 and before the end of the next year thousands of white settlers had swarmed into the territory. But the "Boomers" were not satisfied with the partial opening, and in 1906 the remainder of the reserved lands were thrown open after the 517 Indian children born after allotments had been completed in 1901 had been granted their 160 acres each. Simultaneously, steps were being taken to obtain statehood, and in November of 1907 Oklahoma was formally proclaimed a state of the Union.[2]

Aside from annuities as provided by the treaty of Medicine Lodge, the economy of Comanche reservation society has been based on leases, wage labor, and agriculture. Money from leases provided the first significant revenue. It was enough to allow the government to reduce rations and to permit thrifty and ambitious Comanches the means for starting forth on the white man's road. Leases were of three kinds: permits to graze livestock on the common tribal lands, oil leases and the sale of royalties, and leases of individual allotments for agriculture.

The first grazing leases were made by Agent P. B. Hunt, who persuaded a group of cattlemen to contribute beeves in return for the privilege of grazing cattle on the reservation. The cattlemen had quickly spread their herds over the vast areas vacated by the Indians. Each year hundreds of thousands of head were driven to the northern markets. The Abilene Trail followed the eastern line of the Kiowa-Comanche Reservation; the Dodge City or Great Western Trail crossed its western extremity. By 1877 the Comanches

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2. This introduction is largely from Wallace and Hoebel, op. cit.; cf., E. N. Richardson, The Comanche Barrier to South Plains Settlement (Glendale, California, 1933), for an excellent account with a different approach.

20: Wallace H-4,5 (1945) 1953 NO6 Comanche NO6

After a prolonged controversy, Congress on June 6, 1900, enacted the Jerome Agreement into law, and on July 4, 1901, a presidential proclamation ordered its execution. For the surrendered lands the Indians were to be paid $2,000,000 in four equal installments whenever the Secretary of the Interior deemed it best for the Indians; the unpaid balance was to draw 5 per cent interest, the interest to be paid annually. The law set aside 480,000 acres for a reserve to be held in common by the tribes. On September 1, 1902, all except 60,000 acres of this reserve had been leased for grazing to the highest bidder at rates ranging from twenty-five cents to two dollars an acre, or for a total of $132,269.90 for the year.[7] This was approximately $36 for each Indian man, woman, and child on the reservation. When the reserve was opened to the "Boomers" in 1906, the Indians were left without any common tribal lands to lease.

The individual allotment lease for agricultural purposes replaced the lease of tribal lands held in common. From the first, this type of land rental has been an important factor in Comanche life. After allotments were assigned, each Indian, with agency approval, could lease his own land. From October 1, 1901, when individual leasing began, until September 1, 1902, the agency approved 443 individual agricultural leases.[8] White men who leased Indian private land for agricultural purposes were required to make certain improvements on it. Those leasing in 1910 for a term of five years were required to place on each allotment a three-room house, a well, and to fence the land. The three-year lessees were to fence the land and to make certain general repairs. All improvements were to remain on the land when the lease expired, and they became the property of the land owner.[9]

The wisdom of such a policy is not difficult to understand. The Comanches did not know how to build houses or to improve their farms. They had not yet learned the value of

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7. Agent James F. Randlett, Annual Report, September 1, 1902, in Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Annual Report, 1902, pt. I, 294.
8. Ibid.
9. Superintendent Kiowa-Comanche Agency, Annual Report, September 1, 1910 (Oklahoma Historical Society Library, correspondence files).

20: Wallace H-4,5 (1945) 1953 NO6 Comanche NO6

men's clubs in 1935. During the same year the gardening and food preservation clubs preserved enough to have supplied every Indian family of the agency with more than 100 quarts of canned fruits, plus 37 pounds of dried fruits and vegetables, with 8½ pounds of cured meat. Child welfare clubs made clothes, studied infant care, and dealt with the problem of child health. Home improvement clubs screened homes, made curtains, planted trees, flowers, and shrubs, and dug cellars for the storage of food. Foods nutrition clubs prepared under supervision 3,678 dishes during the year. 4-H Club members canned 837 quarts of food, made 1,183 pieces of clothing, and won two first places and a second place at the state fair.[29]

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Schools for the education of the Indian children of the Kiowa-Comanche Agency have been of three kinds: government boarding, mission, and state public. The government boarding school pioneered the educational program, provided a vocational training curriculum, and in recent years has become the school for orphans and the destitute. Since the government never intended to establish special schools for all the children, the mission schools rendered invaluable aid during the years preceding the opening of the public schools to them. The majority of children now attend public schools.

The Treaty of Medicine Lodge obligated the federal government to provide instruction for the Indians of the reservation. Congress appropriated a very modest sum for that purpose in 1870, and in the same year Josiah Butler and wife obtained permission to establish an agency school. On February 20, 1871, Butler and his wife opened the first school on the reservation in a thirty by sixty foot building located on the present site of Fort Sill Indian School, with four pupils, all Comanches, in attendance. Butler continued the school until June 27, 1873, but found it very difficult to enforce discipline.[30]

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29. McOwen, Annual Report: Narrative Section, 1935, 16-24.
30. Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Annual Report, 1870, 224.

21: Burnet T-5 (1818-1819) 1954 NO6 Comanche NO6
Texas

DAVID G. BURNET'S LETTERS DESCRIBING THE COMANCHE INDIANS WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY ERNEST WALLACE

When the United States purchased Louisiana Territory from France in 1803, she acquired within its upper and western limits several powerful Indian tribes of whom the Anglo-Americans had very little or no knowledge. The Comanche was one of these tribes. They had abandoned the upper Missouri-Yellowstone region during the Eighteenth Century for the southern high plains adjacent to the northern settlements of New Spain. The vast domain lying between the Arkansas River and the South Texas Hill Country and between the Cross Timbers on the east and the Pecos River and the mountain ranges of eastern New Mexico and Colorado on the west the Comanche regarded as *Comancheria*, and for more than a century few there were, either red men or white, who intruded against their will.

Convinced of the superiority of their own way of life, the Comanche resolutely refused to compromise with white civilization until they had been defeated and confined to a reservation. No real mutual trust and friendship ever existed between them and any of their white neighbors. Seldom did a white visitor remain within a Comanche village longer than necessary, and it was most unusual for a Comanche to visit a white settlement except to war and plunder. Consequently, reliable accounts of early Comanche society are rare and meager.

One of the earliest and best descriptions of Comanche society by an Anglo-American observer appeared during 1824 in *The Cincinnati Literary Gazette* in serial form under the heading "Indians of Texas." The article is a series of five letters published in six installments. The first four letters, according to the introductory statement, constitute

21: Burnet T-5 (1818-1819) 195 NO6 Comanche NO6
Texas

(ca. 1818)

detailed account of those tribes with whom my adventures in this delightful country have made me familiar. If the results of my observations can contribute to your amusement, or aid your laudable endeavours to acquire information concerning the wide-spread sons of the forest, I shall be amply remunerated for the trouble of imparting them to you.

The Comanchees are the most numerous, and therefore the most important nation of Indians inhabiting this Province, and with them I am more intimately acquainted than with any of the other tribes. I shall give them priority of notice.

Let the long suspended destiny of this most valuable province eventuate as it may: whether it shall continue to languish under the wretched and paralising policy of Spain, or shall be received under the benign guardianship of our own country, the aboriginal inhabitants of it are worthy to be better known and more considered than they now are. If they are too far removed from *home*, the starting place and often the goal of charity, to merit attention for the beneficent purposes of amelioration, they nevertheless present sufficient claims to occasional observance on grounds of an exclusive political nature. The Comanchees more particularly, owing to their proximity to the frontiers of the Arkansas Territory, and to their forward and unrestrained habits of rapine, appear, in prospective at least, to sustain some interesting relations to our country. It would not be altogether visionary to predict, that in the course of a few years, these obscure and unnoticed savages will evince their claims to our attention by the massacres and devastations of a border warfare. It is true, they now are, and heretofore have been, peaceably disposed towards us. They find the mules and horses of their ancient enemies, the provincial Spaniards, a more alluring quarry, than is presented by the scattered and humble hamlets of an American frontier. It is true, they are apprized of the difference between the American and the Spanish character; they dread the active energy of the one, as they despise the pusillanimity of the other. Had we a dense and populous front to present them,

21: Burnet T-5 (1818-1819) 1951 NO6 Comanche NO6
Texas

[ca. 1818]

175 they would be in no wise dangerous. But how inadequate
721 is an infant, dispersed, and unorganized settlement, to repel the sudden incursions of an enemy who move with unequalled celerity, and almost inscrutable caution: who traverse the pathless wilderness by day, and pounce on their
175 devoted victims in the unguarded hour of midnight. The
648 national faith and friendships of savages are proverbially treacherous, and are always subordinate to their own weak conceptions of interest, or the more imperative suggestions
175 of fear. The hope of spoil for the most part constitutes their
721 *prium mobile* to hostilities: but they are sometimes capable of adventuring the hazards of battle for the single purpose of revenging real or imaginary injuries.

175 The Comanchees or I-etans as they are sometimes called,
101 are one among a very few of the primitive nations of Spanish America, who have preserved their pristine independence. To what cause this singularity is attributable, it is difficult
{173} to determine. Their oral history is extremely limited and imperfect, and they appear to retain no recollections of a
175 period when their political condition was materially dif-
173 ferent from what it now is. Of their origin they know nothing. A regular tradition or national legend, seems never to have entered into the policy of these erratic sons
175 of the forest. Careless of the future, they are indifferent
181 to the benefits that accrue from the recollections of the past. The revolving day imbodies all their concerns. Their
175 songs, which are few and of little variation, however ancient
533 they may be, are rather didactic than historical, and are calculated to fire the warriors zeal, or to give solemnity to
175 funeral lamentations. It is however, presumable, that their
101 wandering mode of life and the remoteness and seclusion of the country through which they have ranged time immemorial, have mainly contributed to perpetuate both the
171 identity and the independence of a tribe, whose numbers
721 and capacities for war, are far inferior to others of their proscribed race, that have become almost or quite extinct, by the deleterious spread of a corrupt and unsocial civilization.

21: Burnet T-5 (1818-1819) 1954 NO6 Comanche NO6
Texas

(ca. 1818)

of the St. Saba, which empties into the Colorado about 60 miles north of St. Antonio. Their migrations are bounded on the west by the mountains, which are generally barren and destitute of game, and on the east by the river Brazos. It is this band principally, that is engaged in the predatory warfare upon the inhabitants of Texas, which they have prosecuted with great assiduity for several years past and which they have continued, with short intervals of peace, from time "whereof the memory of man runneth not to the contrary." Their incursions have not been confined to the province of Texas, which the miserable attempt at revolution in 1812 has effectually, drained of its once immense herds of mules and horses, but they extend their depredations to the several contiguous provinces beyond the Rio Grande. This party can probably bring into the field about 1500 warriors; but to parade this number, I doubt whether they would not be obliged to put in requisition the virgin bows of unfledged boyhood. The largest party they have been known to muster for a campaign, was estimated by eye-witnesses at 12 or 1500 men; and those who are apprised of the imposing spectacle exhibited by a Comanchee parade, will not suspect a *coup d'oeil* estimate, of extenuation. It was known that many of their kindred band, the Yamparacks, were associated with them, and contributed to eke out the formidable array.

I will resume my remarks as opportunity may offer.

B*****.

[*The Cincinnati Literary Gazette*, May 15, 1824]

Letter II

The next party in geographical order is the Yamparacks. These occupy the head waters of the Colorado, occasionally extending their migrations to the tributary streams of the Rio del Norte. They frequently intermingle with, and are found among the Comanchees and are, in no respect dissimilar to them, in manners, customs or appearance, but are virtually the same people, speak the same language, and are characterized by the same peculiarities. There is one

21: Burnet T-5 (1818-1819) 1954 NO6 Comanche NO6
Texas

175 [ca. 1818]
721 regress of small parties from 5 to 50 in number, whose sole object is inglorious predation, and who cautiously avoid all renconters with the enemy, except with the menial herdsmen who attend the droves of the wealthy planters.

[171] [181] Although habitually savage and estranged from the humanizing influence of civilization, the Comanchee warriors are not so wantonly barbarous and sanguinary as many of the primitive nations of our continent. It is true, they 175 seldom give quarter to the Spanish soldiers, and it is equally 726 true, that they seldom receive any from them. It has been alleged too, that they massacre women and children. The charge is not true as to general practice, but there may be some isolated exceptions, growing out of pressing emergency 175 or some extraordinary excitement. When reproved on this 721 awful subject, these undisciplined warriors justify their deeds of horror, as more enlightened nations have attempted to justify theirs, by the law of retaliation: and I suspect that a strict investigation would evince but little disparity in the inhumanities that are reciprocally practiced by these savage and semi-savage belligerents.

175 The Comanchees are always at war with the Osages and 721 Pawnees. A formal declaration has perhaps never tran- 648 spired, but whenever they meet, hostilities ensue. Frequent and sometimes sanguinary recontres happen between them, 175 the Osages and Pawnees being in general the aggressors. In the fall of the year these tribes abandon their villages, and 721 lead a wandering life, ostensibly for the purpose of hunting. They often roam as far as the Comanchee region, professedly in quest of Buffalo, but in reality to "spoil the spoiler of his prey," in which they frequently succeed so far as to return well mounted, although they always leave home on foot. The Comanchees sometimes retaliate upon them by carrying the war into their country; but having little to gain by these excursions, they are unfrequent. Simple bootless war, has few attractions for a people who have neither poets nor historians to perpetuate the fame of their achievements.

175 Strong attachment to kindred is a prominent feature in
152

23: Cabello y Robles G-3 (1778-1786) 1961
NO6 Comanche NO6
Eastern Comanche

A DESCRIPTION OF THE COMANCHE INDIANS IN 1786 BY THE GOVERNOR OF TEXAS*

TRANSLATED AND EDITED BY ODIE B. FAULK

The Comanches first appeared in New Mexico in 1706. By mid-century they had driven the Jicarrilla Apaches from the northeastern region of that province and were devastating the Spanish settlements east of the Rio Grande. Continuing their advance southward, these fierce warriors drove the Texas Apaches back upon the Spanish settlements at San Antonio and below the Rio Grande. Their victory at San Saba in 1758 over the Spaniards, whom they considered to be Apache allies, assured their domination on the plains.

Under the illusion that the Comanches would remain away from the settled areas of their control, the Spaniards determined in 1779 to form an alliance with them with the intent of the total destruction or reduction of the Apaches. Although participation in the American Revolution interfered to some extent with the plan, Spanish officials proceeded, nevertheless, with their efforts to bring the Comanches into an alliance. In New Mexico Governor Juan Bautista de Anza (1778-1788) secured the desired treaty with the Western Comanches (Yamparikas) in July, 1785, and in Texas Governor Domingo Cabello y Robles (1778-1786) achieved the same goal in October, 1785, with the Eastern Comanches (Kotsetekas and Penatekas).

The acting commandant-general of the Interior Provinces, José Antonio de Rengel (1784-1786), desiring information which would indicate whether the Comanche raiders would keep the peace treaties they had just signed, sent the gover-

*Domingo Cabello, "Respuestas q se el Govr de la Prova de los Texas da a las Preguntas que el Sñr Como Gral de las Yntern le hace en oficio de 27 de Enero de 1786: sobre varias circumstancias de los Yndios Cumanches Orientales," April 30, 1786, Bexar Archives (University of Texas Archives, Austin).

23: Cabello y Robles G-3 (1778-1786) 1961
NO6 Comanche NO6
Eastern Comanche

[ca. 1786]
aforesaid chiefs has been by election and vote of all the Eastern Nation; [the two chiefs] having [already] made themselves very distinguished in the encounters of war with their enemies, by which they gained the esteem of all their Nation and the following which they have; in the councils that they hold, always their vote decides, and the rest of the Nation does not oppose them.

EIGHTH: What Is the Personal Character of These Chiefs and the Influence That They Have, and Are Able to Have in the Negotiations of the Nation?

As the two great captains previously mentioned have not come to this presidio of San Antonio de Béxar, the governor has not been able to learn their character, but if the experiences of the six lesser captains that have come to the ratification of the peace treaties [are a basis for judging], they are of a generous spirit and have manifested more friendliness to the Spaniards than the captains of the other friendly Nations of the North. It has been observed that the retinue of the chiefs [of the Nations of the North] look at the [Comanche] chiefs with more respect and give them more subordination than they do their own chiefs.

With respect to the rest of the observations that the governor has made of this nation, he has come to understand that it is necessary to treat them with much friendliness and consistency, for they are, in short, of a very sensitive nature and do not accommodate themselves to any harshness. Without compromising the dignity of his office, it is indispensible [that the governor] manifest toward them all love, and make them believe in the governor, for them to behave satisfactorily toward [the Spaniards]; for if they begin to lack confidence, they take many precautions and manifest their vexation; in virtue of which it is necessary that a governor of the Province of Texas, whom they call Father, have the gravest finesse and precautions in dealing with the said Indians, in order to keep them always

23: Cabello y Robles G-3 (1778-1786) 1961
NO6 Comanche NO6
Eastern Comanche

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648 pleased and content. Through that means and by presenting them with those trinkets which they are accustomed to receiving, by which means he will be able to obtain peace treaties, trade, and communication with them, constant and truthful. That is how much the governor has been able to inquire and investigate the character of this Nation.
Royal Presidio of San Antonio de Béxar, April 30, 1876.

DOMINGO CABELLO.

24: Richardson H-4 (no date) 1929 NO6 Comanche NO6
(1854-1859) Texas

657 643 that Ka-tem-e-see was an imposter and that he, Sanaco, was the real head of the Comanches.[4] Years of warfare with white men and 643 178 savages and the struggle for existence incident to this confusion had demoralized the savages and weakened their tribal organiza- 619 tion. There was not, in fact, any head chief and there had not 657 been for several years. But these jealousies added substantially 578 to the many difficulties the United States was destined to en- 181 counter in its efforts to point these people towards peace and civil- 178 ization. Pride and independence were virtues these Indians no [657] longer could boast of. Even Ka-tem-e-see begged of the commis- sion corn and meat from their private stock of goods.

657 When Agent Neighbors returned in November, 1854, to es- [162] tablish the reservation, he found on the Clear Fork large parties of Wacoes, Caddoes, Tawakonies and other smaller bands together with "the whole Southern band" of Comanches, the number of the latter being, according to his estimate, between one thousand and twelve hundred souls. Another council was held and the Indians urged that the Government hurry the preparations for the 657 reservation since they were in a starving condition.[5] But not- withstanding the general eagerness on the part of the Indians about 648 two-thirds of them were not located on the reservation at the time and perhaps half of them never accepted life there because of an unfortunate circumstance which must be charged largely to a 648 blunder of the United States military forces. While some of chief 439 Sanaco's people were at Fort Chadburne, about sixty miles to the southwest, on a friendly trading expedition, they were told by a certain Leyendecker, an Indian trader, that the white people were 648 making plans to attack them and kill them all. "If you want any- thing more," said Leyendecker to the Indians, "trade quickly, mount your horses, go to Sanaco's camp, and tell him the white people are collecting together to kill him and his people, I see it on this paper; tell him if he wishes to live to go north as quickly as possible—do not eat, sleep or rest, until you give him this talk from his friend."[6]

[113] 4. R. B. Marcy, Thirty Years of Army Life On the Border, (New York, 1866) p. 284. See also W. B. Parker, Notes Taken Through Unexplored Texas, 1854 (Philadelphia, 1856) p. 186.

[113] 5. Neighbors to Manypenny, Commissioner of Indians Affairs, January 2, 1855. Ms. University of Texas, photostat copy.

[113] 6. Hill to Neighbors, August 31, 1855, gives an account of these happenings of January preceding. Thirty-fourth Congress, First Session, Sen. Doc. No. 1, Part 1, 502.

24: Richardson H-4 (no date) 1929 NO6 Comanche NO6
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pede. If Neighbor's estimate of a thousand or twelve hundred souls be accepted as the approximate population of the Southern Comanches, it is evident that not more than a fourth of these Indians were at the reservation when it was established. The two most influential chiefs, Buffalo Hump, a chronic disturber, and Sanaco, destined to become quite as great a rogue, were still at large. Other Indians came in at different times, so that on one occasion there were 557 souls; but 350 or 400 would represent a fair average for the whole period.[9] Evidently many Indians came and left very much at will, in spite of the efforts of the agents to hold them.

It would have been much better if the renegades had stayed away altogether, for their chiefs were jealous of Ka-tem-e-see and frequently connived to supersede him. During the winter of 1855-1856, Sanaco came in, gave up some horses his people had stolen in the country west of San Antonio, and returned to the prairies to bring in his band. He brought in his people according to promise, but soon left because as he alleged, troops were arriving at Camp Cooper and he felt that this would mean that his braves could get whiskey. However, he must have known that his men could get whiskey while running at large even more easily than at the reservation. A more plausible reason for his leaving is that given by the agent, John R. Baylor, namely, that he found he could not supersede his rival, Ka-tem-e-see. His band became even more lawless and was charged with a number of robberies and murders. Once, in jocular mood, the chief sent word by an Indian runner that he would bring his people in if Major Neighbors would furnish him and his people with all the whiskey they could drink. And they would stay, he said, as long as the whiskey lasted!

Buffalo Hump was even more troublesome than Sanaco. He would come in and make many promises stating that he had reformed and was determined to live the life of a good, honest Indian henceforth. But, if the spirit was willing the flesh was weak in the case of Buffalo Hump; and as soon as the agent had made him presents in consideration for his profession of good intentions he would steal away to the prairies to plunder and rob and live

9. The different reports of the agents show numbers as follows: January 1, 1854, 450; September 8, 1854, 557; September, 1857, 434; January 17, 1858, 381; September 16, 1858, 371; October 30, 1858, 341; July, 1859, 382.

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657 in his old savage way. Then, when his blankets were worn out
648 and game became scarce and stealing unprofitable he would return to repeat the process.[10] On one occasion this chief almost
648 started a war between the Comanches and the Indians on the Brazos reservation. With Ka-tem-e-see and about seventy-five warriors he went to that reservation and approached the Anadarko village in a threatening manner. The women and children of this and neighboring villages fled and panic seized the entire Indian community. Fortunately the veteran Anadarko chief, Jose Maria, was looking for trouble, had his men armed and prepared for action and informed the intruders that he was ready either for "fight" or "talk." The Comanches chose to talk and through the efforts of the Brazos agent, S. P. Ross, and his interpreter, Jim Shaw, violence was avoided. When called upon to explain their extraordinary conduct, the Comanches, evidently much embarrassed at the turn the affair had taken, said that all was well, they were satisfied, but they wished to ask just one question: "Were the Caddoes going to continue to act as guides for the troops?"

This question explains the whole affair. No doubt Buffalo Hump, using the milder Ka-tem-e-see as a tool, had hoped to frighten the smaller bands into discontinuing the valuable aid they had been rendering the troops as scouts and guides. It may be that Buffalo Hump himself had suffered because of the skill and faithfulness of these scouts. It is certain that in the years that followed the wiley old renegade was much annoyed by these scouts for as a leader of the wild Comanche bands he was often
657 trailed and surprised by these very Indians. Although these Co-
648 manches were wards of the Government and living off of its bounty
186 their sympathy for their wild marauding kinsmen was stronger than that for any agent or soldier and they resented the fact that these more civilized Indians were taking such an active part in the interest of law and order.

657 In addition to these run-away Southern Comanches other
648 wild Indians made the work of the agents difficult and caused the
628 life of the reservation Indians to be haunted by many fears. The-
101 were several distinct Comanche bands that had never had any inti-

[113] 10. See Anna Heloise Abel, The American Indian as Slaveholder and Secessionist, page 315, for a letter from M. Looper, once Comanche agent in Texas, to Elias Rector, December 12, 1861. In this letter Looper gives a short biography of Buffalo Hump and pronounces an anathema to his memory.

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mate relations with the Penatekas or Southern bands. Along Red River and the Canadian were the Tanimas, Nokonies and Kotsotekas, to the north were the Yamarikas and in the plains region were the fierce Kwaharies. Associated with these northern bands were the Kiowas, fierce and powerful. Parties from these different bands frequently visited the reservation, coming as friends or lurking near as enemies as best suited their purposes. Naturally the going and coming of these wild kinsmen and their occasional presence at or near the reservation made it very difficult for the agents to control their wards. Furthermore, in their raids against the Texas settlements and the North Mexican states these parties often passed near the reservation. This, according to Agent Leeper, was done both to steal additional horses from the reserve Indians and to direct the attention of the pursuers to those Indians in order that they might be charged to the innocent while the guilty made their escape. Indeed the Indians of the reservation frquently suffered severe losses of horses at the hands of these marauders.[11] During the last years of the reservation there developed an estrangement between its inhabitants and their wild kinsmen and at times the wards felt that their lives were insecure, although the agency was near by and the military post but two miles away. In May, 1858, Ka-tem-e-see took his boys out of school in order to keep them near him and better protect them from the wrath of the marauders of the north. By this time the chief had lost his enthusiasm for the wild Indians and on one occasion said that he did not care if the troops killed them all.[12]

On at least one occasion a lawless visitor came near causing a general revolt. One Santa Anna, a notoriously bad Indian, came and put up in Ka-tem-e-see's cabin. Since this was the only cabin on the reservation perhaps the insolent fellow felt that lodging accommodations were poor enough and he proposed to take the best. It was even rumored that he planned to supersede Ka-tem-e-see and make himself chief of the reservation. The chief ordered this Indian and his companion, a Nokoni Comanche, to leave; but they informed him that they were resting from their arduous journey and did not propose to leave until it suited their conven-

11. Leeper's Report, December 31, 1857. Ms. University of Texas photostat copy.

12. J. Shirley, employee at Barnard's trading house at the reservation, to C. E. Barnard, May 6, 1858. Ms. University of Texas photostat copy. Also, Leeper to Neighbors, February 6, 1858. Ibid.

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do them but for the fact that the fear of the white frontiersmen and wild Indians forced them to keep up their horses and feed them much of the time.[22] This partial elimination of the communist system had a wholesome effect, but it would have been impossible to carry it much farther because of the scarcity of arable land. A division of land so that each family head would have had a parcel separate and apart from the others would have become utterly impossible after a generation or two. Thus the cramped conditions on the small reservation would have acted as a barrier to progress even if the Indians had been permitted to remain there.

Many of the citizens of Texas complained that the reservation Indians were treacherous and dangerous and yet some of those persons living near the reserve vouched for the honesty of the Indians and stated that they regarded them as friends rather than enemies.[23] The settlement and development of the country in the vicinity of the reservation indicates that the white people generally had confidence in the peaceful disposition of the savages. It is significance that the most serious complaints did not come from those persons living near the reservation but from settlements a hundred or more miles away.

Some of the children made good progress in school. In 1858, it was reported that ten boys were in school and in a later account they were reported to be learning remarkably fast. Thomas T. Hawkins, special agent, who was sent to investigate the reservation in 1858, wrote of the Comanches:

> I regard them as superior in natural sense and intelligence to any of our full blooded native tribes—and I have seen many specimens in Washington, in the west and upon my journey hither.[24]

At times the Indians manifested some disposition to exercise tribal government sufficient to restrain unruly members. Once when a certain Indian, named Jack Porter, and two or three fol-

22. Neighbor's report, September 14, 1857. Thirty-Fifth Congress, First Session, Sen. Exec. Doc. No. 11, Vol. II. Also, Neighbors to Manypenny, May 14, 1854, and H. P. Jones, reservation farmer to M. Leeper, October 29, 1858, University of Texas photostat copies.

23. Thomas Lambshead (a citizen) to Manypenny, May 1, 1854. Ms. University of Texas photostat copy. Also, Hawkins to Mix, October 30, 1858, Ibid.

24. Hawkins to Mix, October 30, 1858. Ms. University of Texas photostat copy.

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626 623 lowers returned from a raid to Mexico with twelve stolen horses, a council of chiefs was called to consider the matter and the culprits were informed that if they repeated the act they would all be shot.[25] However, it must be said that the exercise of authority generally stopped with admonition and an influential warrior had little to fear from a council composed of his fellow warriors. 622 Chief Ka-tem-e-see was given the use of a cabin and was paid thirty [657] dollars per month to act as head chief. From all accounts he took [434] his position quite seriously and worked faithfully to lead his people [166] aright. In one report it is stated that several females had recently deserted the reservation because of punishment he had inflicted upon them. Apparently the braves were dealt with more tactfully.

Breaking Up the Reservation

657 Naturally the people of Texas had expected that the establishment of the reservations whereby the Indians were given the opportunity to maintain a comfortable existence under government supervision would improve frontier Indian conditions. But this 648 hope proved to be in vain. The various bands of Southern Comanches who refused to settle, together with parties of their northern kinsmen and the Lipans and small parties of other tribes continued to harass the settlements to such an extent as to call forth protests from many sources. Conditions not only did not improve but, according to the accounts of that day, grew worse from year to year, especially after 1856.

From the very beginning, and for good reasons, some of the frontier citizens had come to regard the reservations as a source 648 of trouble. It is true that the agents did their best to control their 657 Indians and they certainly never tolerated theft when they could prevent it. However, with Indians coming and going in such promiscous fashion it was utterly impossible for the agents to know just what their wards were doing. Although some of the frontiersmen made allegations to the contrary, there is overwhelming evidence to the effect that ranchmen who came to hunt their lost or stolen stock were extended every aid and courtesy by the agents and Ka-tem-e-see. They rarely ever found their property there,

[113] 25. Neighbor's report, September 16, 1858, Thirty-fifth Congress, Second Session, Sen. Exec. Doc. No. 1, Vol. I, p. 324.

24: Richardson H-4 (no date) 1929 NO6 Comanche NO6
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657 but when they did it was readily given up.[26] But no agent, however tactful, could long avoid a clash with the frontiersmen on this point. They naturally gave little consideration to the rights of the Indians, expected the word of any white man to be accepted over the denial of any number of Indians, and misunderstandings and disputes over property soon arose. The agents all the while stoutly maintained that their Indians were innocent and, although we may have some doubts to their contentions, they were certainly sincere. Likewise the frontiersmen were just as sincere in laying much of their trouble to the wards of the agents and as affairs progressed each side became more determined and emphatic. [166] When the citizens failed to find their stock at the reservation they concluded that the marauders had left the reservation, had stolen the horses from the settlements, and then had made their way to join their wild friends to the north; and the large number of desertions from the reservation evidenced by the census returns furnish considerable foundation for this point of view.

During the latter part of 1857, petitions signed by Texas citizens were sent to the Secretary of the Interior asking that Neighbors be removed from office. These persons alleged that the reserve Indians had been stealing horses all along although Neighbors kept denying it. They charged that at different times they had found their stolen horses on the reservation, that the superintendent had refused to give them up and that there was no means left for them whereby they could secure their property. Other complaints were made, one being that signed by twenty-seven men addressed to Agent Leeper informing him that they would not henceforth honor his passports to Indians but that they proposed to attack any and all Indians found off of the reservation except where they were accompanied by responsible white persons. Their reasons for this threat appears to have been the report they had received that certain Indians whom they had pursued had since made threats against them. Furthermore, they would have Leeper inform the Indians that if there should be "a man killed on this river and there is the least proof that it was done by the Indians from the reserve

[113] 26. On this mooted point see J. B. (Buck) Barry to Hawkins, November 8, 1858. Ms. University of Texas photostat copy. Barry, who in his Reminiscences (Manuscript, University of Texas Archives), bitterly condemns the reservation Indians, said in this letter of 1858, that Major Neighbors treated him in a "clever and gentlemanly manner" in the matter of his efforts to recover stolen horses.

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657 ... We will attack the reserve with a sufficient force to *break it up*
648 regardless of consequences.[27]

657 In January, 1858, a select committee of the state senate criticized severely the United States Indian policy in the state, referring to the fact that only a fraction of the Comanche Indians were located on the reservation and that friendly Indians were in the habit of passing and repassing into the settlements. Thus, they contended, wild Indians were mistaken for friendly ones and the white people were thus placed at the mercy of marauding bands. In addition to their recommendations for better military protection the committee stated that the agents should not permit the Indians to leave the reservations.[28]

[648] If these charges should be accepted at their face value they would represent within themselves rather convincing proof against the reservation Indians, but the records show that the whole issue was so completely shot through with bias and personal animosity that one is unable to know what to accept or reject. Reference has already been made to the ill feeling that pervailed between Robert S. Neighbors, the Superintendent of Indian Affairs in Texas, and some of the army officers. Furthermore, John R. Baylor, who seems to have been dismissed from the Indian service through Neighbor's influence, led in much of the agitation.

657 But regardless of the merits or injustice of the charges brought
648 against the reservation Indians feeling against them became so widespread and bitter that in February, 1858, Neighbors asked that special instructions be given the military to protect the reserve Indians from attacks by citizens. In May he made a trip to Washington to place the matter before the officials there, alleging that the soldiers could not be depended upon to protect the Indians because of the indifference of their officers.[29] In October, the sheriff of Young county, armed with a writ issued by the county court, set forth from Belknap with a posse of about forty citizens to arrest

[113] 27. W. G. Preston and others to M. Leeper, February 1, 1858. Ms. University of Texas photostat copy. John R. Baylor, Comanche agent until he was dismissed in May, 1857, is among the signers of this letter to Leeper.

[113] 28. "Report of Select Committee on Indian Affairs," State Gazette, Austin, March 27, 1858. George B. Erath, Henry E. McCulloch, Forbes Brittin, J. W. Throckmorton, and E. B. Scarborough composed the committee.

[113] 29. Neighbors to Mix, written at Washington, D. C., May 13, 1858. Neighbors complained that Major Paul, at Fort Belknap, Captain Stoneman at Camp Cooper, and Captain Givens, who owned a ranch about six miles from the reservation, had opposed him all along and had tried to incite the citizens against the Indians.

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657 a reservation Indian charged with committing an attack on a young
● 648 man named Johnson some months before. On hearing of the approach of the party Neighbors called on Captain Palmer at Camp Cooper for an escort, advanced with the escort and met the sheriff's party some distance from the reservation and finally persuaded the party to give up their purpose. Whether the sheriff desisted because of the law in the case or by fear of the United States soldiers was a matter of doubt in the minds of observers.[30]

657 The complaints against the agents and the reservation Indians led to the sending of a special agent to investigate the administration of affairs. This agent, Thomas T. Hawkins, stayed at Camp Cooper for five weeks and every opportunity was given the complaintants to make their appearance and testify as to their charges; but few of them did so and nothing of consequence was submitted. Hawkins' report commended the agents and the administration of both reservations very highly. The critics alleged that the investigation was *ex parte* and that it was intended from the beginning to "whitewash" the record of the Indian administration in Texas; but we should have more sympathy with them if they had gone through with their part of the program and submitted whatever evidence they had.

Perhaps the strongest testimony in favor of the Comanches is
657 that of John S. Ford and E. N. Burleson of the Ranger forces. They
648 came with their command to the vicinity of the reservation in the spring of 1858 when they and their officers were practically unanimous in the belief that the reservation Indians were committing depredations. These men were seasoned frontiersmen, had the frontiersmen's natural hatred and distrust of all Indians and were determined to secure evidence against the savages that could not be refuted. However, although they stayed for some time and sent out many scouts they found nothing whatever to confirm their suspicions. Ford states in his affidavit that when they found that
657 they could not secure any evidence against the Indians Captain Allison Nelson, one of the foremost critics of Neighbors, suggested to him that it would be very easy to make a trail leading into the reservation, but Ford would not hear to this. Nelson reported that the people in the vicinity of the reservation did not want it broken up and it was decided to abandon the idea. Ford quoted Nelson as

[113]

30. See the letter of a correspondent to the New York Herald, November 15, 1858.

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stating that Neighbors had always escaped from the attacks of his enemies, but that men were after him "now" who were going to get his job.[31]

Naturally so much excitement and ill will inspired cruelty. In May, 1858, an inoffensive old Comanche was slain by a party of white men who wanted to get his horses and took advantage of the fact that he was away from the reservation without an escort or pass.[32] Late in December, a little party of friendly Indians from the Brazos reservation, known as Choctaw Tom's party, were attacked in their camp at night near Palo Pinto, whither they had gone by the consent of their agent and where they were regarded by the people of the immediate community as friendly and dependable. In fact, Choctaw Tom, the leader of the party, had returned to the reservation, but some of his people had remained near Palo Pinto in order to accept an invitation of some citizens of the community to stay a little longer and hunt bear with them.[33] The party that attacked the Indians was composed of citizens of Erath and neighboring counties further down the Brazos valley. They alleged that these Indians had been committing depredations but there is very little foundation for this contention.

The killing of these Indians created general excitement along the frontier because of the fear that their tribesmen would retaliate. The men who made the unwarranted attack on Choctaw Tom's party were never arrested although the governor by special proclamation called for their arrest. The grand jury of Palo Pinto county refused to indict the men but instead, indicted Jose Maria, the Anadarko chief, for horse stealing and in their report stated that the reservations were nuisances and that the people ought to take up arms against the Indians.[34] "Gatherings" of frontiersmen began to take place and many white men who had up to this time maintained a neutral or indifferent attitude began to join in the clamor against the savages. No doubt many of these men felt that the party from

31. Affidavit of John S. Ford and E. N. Burleson, November 22, 1858. University of Texas photostat copy.

32. Shirley to Barnard, May 6, 1858; Evans to Looper, May 2, 1858. Ms. University of Texas photostat copies.

33. J. J. Sturm, farmer at the Brazos agency, to Ross, December 28, 1858. Thirty-sixth Congress, First Session, Sen. Exec. Doc. No. 2, Vol. I, p. 568. See also, the statement of Daniel Thornton, Peter Garland and others who attacked the Indians, made at Palo Pinto, January 4, 1859, Ibid, p. 606.

34. A copy of the report of the Grand Jury may be found in the Runnels Papers, Texas State Archives.

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Erath county had made a mistake in attacking the peaceful Indians, but they believed that the kinsmen of these Indians as well as the Comanches would retaliate and that there could be no peace on the frontier until both reservations were broken up. The agitators took advantage of this state of mind and never lost an opportunity to appeal to the fears and prejudices of the frontier people. It must not be understood that these men were "the very worst frontier characters" as the Indians agents sometimes charged. Among their leaders were John R. Baylor, former Indian agent; Peter Garland, of Erath county; R. W. Pollard, of Palo Pinto county; J. B. (Buck) Barry, of Bosque county, all prominent citizens in their communities and highly regarded by most of their neighbors. The years of bitter struggle with the Indians had hardened the hearts of the frontier people. As one of the more conservative of them has written in his memoirs, the frontier people were "always crazed at the sight of Indians and determined to kill,"[35] and when the safety of their families was involved they were wont to act first and investigate afterwards.

However, notwithstanding these "gatherings" of frontiersmen with all their fear and frenzy no drastic action was taken during the winter of 1858-1859, which is to be accounted for in part, at least, by the firm attitude maintained by the army officers who were guarding the reservations. The immediate objective of these threatening movements had been the "lower" or Brazos reservation. This was not because the white men regarded these Indians as the more culpable but rather because they felt that both the Brazos and Comanche reservations must be broken up and the Brazos Indians being the more numerous and powerful were regarded as the chief obstacle to be overcome.

Long before this crisis came the agents had felt that the Indians should be moved from Texas and as early as the summer of 1857 Neighbors had recommended that they be taken to the Indian Territory.[36] But the authorities in Washington did not give any consideration to the proposal and it was dropped for the time. Then came the demonstrations against the Indians during the winter and spring of 1859, and Neighbors again insisted that if the Indians

35. "Memoirs of George B. Erath," in the Southwestern Historical Quarterly, XXVII, 16.

36. Neighbors to Mix, August 5, 1857. Ms. University of Texas photostat copy.

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were not removed they would be driven away by the mad settlers. The government at Washington was slow to appreciate the gravity of the situation and the agents became frantic in their effort to secure authority to do what they knew was essential to save their wards from destruction. Finally, on March 30, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs wrote that the Indians would be moved in the fall or winter following. But this announcement did not satisfy the white people and Neighbors continued his efforts to secure authority to remove his wards at once.[37] Neighbors said that he and his associates had "stood their ground" so far, but that they wanted their superiors to share with them the responsibility for determining what should be done when the next crisis came, as it certainly would come. A little later came a resolution signed by a hundred and fifty men demanding that Neighbors and the resident agents, Ross and Leeper, resign.[38]

The situation was already critical enough when an army officer by an imprudent act provoked a disturbance that removed the last ray of hope for peace on the frontier until the Indians were removed. A Brazos reservation Indian named Fox, had been killed by a party of Jack county rangers in brutal fashion. This officer led a party of reservation Indians in search of Fox's slayers and caused great consternation by escorting them into the town of Jacksboro one night. This incident gave the radical party an excellent torch and they now set the whole frontier aflame with excitement.[39] The citizens at once organized themselves into "ranger companies" and surrounded both reservations, threatening the Indians and their agents day and night and preventing the savages from gathering up their stock.[40] On May 23, John R. Baylor at the head of about 250 men came onto the Brazos reservation; but the soldiers stood their ground and the citizens withdrew, not however, until they had picked a fight with some of the Indians. The Indians pursued them for some distance and considerable fighting took place.[41] The settlers declared that they would raise a thousand men and take

37. Mix to Neighbors, March 30, 1859. Thirtieth Congress, First Session, Sen. Doc. No. 2, p. 631. Neighbors to Mix, April 11, 1859. Ms. University of Texas photostat copy.
38. "Resolutions," April 25, 1859. Ms. University of Texas photostat copy.
39. J. R. Worrall of Jacksboro, June 1, 1859, to the Editor, The Dallas Herald, June 15, 1859.
40. Neighbors to Mix, May 12, 1859, and Ross to Neighbors, May 12, 1859. Ms. University of Texas photostat copies.
41. Report of Captain J. B. Plummer, of the United States Army. Thirty-sixth Congress, First Session, Sen. Exec. Doc. No. 2, p. 644.

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both reservations by storm. But sufficient forces were not forthcoming and the "Army of Defense," as the frontiersmen had called themselves, disbanded for a time. Their fury was allayed somewhat by the act of the governor in appointing a board of commissioners to visit the camp of the citizens and endeavor to work out a peaceful method of attaining their ends. The commission visited the frontier communities, heard the complaints of the angry citizens and in their report of findings quite naturally declared the Indians guilty of the offenses charged.[42] But Baylor and other frontier leaders kept up the agitation and, in order to prevent another gathering, G. B. Erath, one of the governor's commissioners, called out a special force of one hundred militiamen from McLellan and Bell counties in order to assure the citizens that the Indians were being watched.[43] However, from all accounts it seems that the frontiersmen did not propose to leave to others the matter of watching the Indians and during the last few weeks preceding the removal the Indians of both reservations were harassed on every hand and dared not leave their agencies to gather up their animals, many of which were out on the range. On one occasion a fight occurred near the Comanche reservation in which both the Indians and citizens suffered some injuries.

Authority for the immediate removal of the Indians was finally granted on June 11 and on July 31, the Indians from both reservations, escorted by United States soldiers started on their journey to the valley of the Washita in Indian Territory.

The census made at the time the journey was begun showed that 1112 Indians left the Brazos reservation and 384 Comanches left the upper reservation. It was estimated that the Comanches took away with them live stock worth $9,550, and that they lost, or were forced to leave behind, live stock worth in the aggregate of $14,922.50.[44] The cost of both reservations to the United States Government had ranged between $61,655.25, for 1857, and

42. Report of John Henry Brown, G. B. Erath, J. M. Steiner, J. M. Smith and Richard Coke, to Governor Runnels, Waco, June 27, 1859. Thirty-sixth Congress, Second Session, Sen. Exec. Doc. No. 2, pp. 665-671.

43. Erath to Rose and Neighbors, June 30, 1859. Thirty-sixth Congress, First Session Sen. Exec. Doc. No. 2, p. 663.

44. Neighbors' Memorandum, no date. Ms. University of Texas photostat copy.

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AN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY COMANCHE DOCUMENT[1]

By ALFRED B. THOMAS

THE Tally Sheet, the photostatic document reproduced as plate 2, is the report of a campaign conducted by the Comanche allies of the New Mexican Spaniards against the Apache in the year 1786. Considerable interest attaches to this report. Historically, it contributes a detail in Spanish Indian policy on the northern frontier of New Spain in the late eighteenth century; anthropologically, it reveals possibly the earliest known arrangement of Comanche military societies in a war party. It may be viewed as the earliest Plains pictographic record known; at least this Spanish document indicates that it is a copy of such a record.

The historical background briefly is this. Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the Spaniards and Pueblos of New Mexico suffered from incessant Ute, Comanche, and Apache attack. In defense Spain supported one tribe against the other: early in the eighteenth century Spaniard and Apache fought Ute and Comanche, the latter just then appearing on the northern horizon of the Southwest. The turn of the half-century saw this situation reversed; the Comanche now occupying Apache lands northeast of the province forced the Spaniards to seek Comanche friendship and at the same time arrange to turn their united energies on the displaced Apache, who pillaged New Mexico from the east and south.[2]

The Tally Sheet is a direct result of an action arising, under these conditions, from a treaty with the Comanche, signed February 28, 1786, according to the fourth article of which inces-

[1] The original of this document, the Tally Sheet reproduced here, is in Audiencia de Guadalajara 103-5-6 No. 43 (Archivo General de Indias, Seville). Another copy is located in Archivo General y Publico, Provincias Internas, Tomo 65 (Mexico City). (See footnote 4.) This article presents an aspect of the writer's study of the northern and northeastern frontiers of Spanish New Mexico, 1593-1821.

[2] A. B. Thomas, Spanish Expeditions into Colorado 1540-1779. The Colorado Magazine of the Colorado State Hist. Soc., November 1924. Also, Spanish Exploration of Oklahoma 1599-1792. Chronicles of Oklahoma, June 1928.

[See facing p. 294—Analyst.]

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(1786)

sant war was to be made on the Apache.[3] The Comanche conducted their campaign between May 13 and July 5, possibly the first under the above treaty. The scene of the engagement appears from various details to have been in the Sandia Mountain region south of Santa Fé. The name of the Apache band attacked is unknown.

In the *Noticia*, translated below, are found the names of most of the Comanche chiefs who took part in the peace celebration and in the campaign, the meanings of each of their names in Spanish, a statement of the number of tents under the command of each and of the then three divisions of the Comanche about New Mexico, namely, Yupe, Yamparica, and Cuchanec, or Cuchantica.[4] Elsewhere in his reports[5] Governor Anza indicates that the Yupe occupied the region north of the Rio Napestle (the Arkansas river) as far as the southern part of present Wyoming; that the Yamparica extended across the northern part of Colorado[6] of today, and southward among the Yupe to the Rio Napestle; and that between the Napestle and the present Red river ranged the Cuchanec, whom Anza briefly described from information just furnished him by Francisco Xavier Ortiz, an emissary to these Comanche. Between the Pecos and the Red rivers, Ortiz found eight Cuchanec rancherias located in a quadrangle roughly forty leagues square, that is, about one hundred miles square. Therein he estimated that the smallest rancheria had thirty tents,

[3] Relacion de los Sucesos ocurridos en la Provincia del Nuevo-Mexico con motivo de la Paz concedida a la Nacion Comanche y su reconciliacion de la Yuta, desde 17 de Noviembre de 1785" hasta 15" de Julio de 86" (Provincias Internas, Tomo 65, Archivo General y Publico, Mexico City). This Relacion, divided into fifty numbered paragraphs, is a summary of the reports of Governor Anza of New Mexico over the above months. Hereafter citation will be simply Relacion with paragraph number. The writer is indebted to the American Council of Learned Societies for assistance in securing copies of this Relacion and related material in the archives of Mexico City.

[4] This Noticia is an enclosure accompanying the above Relacion in Tomo 65 of the Provincias Internas. With this Noticia there is also another copy of the Tally Sheet reproduced here. (See footnote 1.).

[5] Relacion, paragraphs 2 and 3.

[6] The Yamparica were also noted in this area eight years previously by Dominguez and Escalante, two padres who made an expedition in 1779 northwest of New Mexico (Diario y derrotero de los RR PP Fr. Francisco Atanasio Dominguez y F. Silvestre Velez de Escalante in Documentos para la Historia de Mexico, segunda serie, tomo I, 392–420).

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all eight about seven hundred, and that there were three to four warriors in each tent, i.e., between six and seven thousand souls.[7] He noted, too, that these Comanche owned about nine hundred beasts of burden, including five herds of mares. More specifically he mentioned that Chief Canaquaipe ruled over one hundred and fifty-five tents, and Chief Malla (Equeracapa), one hundred and fifty-seven. Eastward beyond these Cuchanec Ortiz reported others who ranged as far as the Jumano and Taguayace,[7] then settled on lands in southern present Oklahoma and northern Texas, near the town of Ringgold, Texas, of today.[8] The accuracy of this information was shortly established by Spanish explorers who between 1787–1789 visited the Taguayace and Comanche along the Red river in that area.[9]

From an anthropological point of view, the photostatic record of the Comanche report adds further interesting details to the small fund of Comanche information.[10] It will be noted that this Tally Sheet reveals the Comanche organized into five groups with the leaders of each, accompanied by a lance, standing in a very definite position with regard to each group. The *Noticia* also has the Comanche chiefs' names arranged in five groups. Possibly this organization is characteristic of the later eighteenth century Comanche arrangement in a war party. Lowie refers to a similar organization of Comanche bands.

[7] Vnforme de Franco Xavier Ortiz. This Informe also accompanies the above Relacion in Tomo 65 of the Provincias Internas. Ortiz was among the Comanche from April to May, 1786, to see how they were observing the peace treaty of the past February. Ortiz was accompanied by Josef Manuel Roxo who claimed and was supported by testimonials from twenty-one prominent citizens of New Mexico, that he had voluntarily made a journey east of Pecos in the preceding January (1786) and had persuaded some Comanche to visit Anza for the purpose of making the peace finally entered into. See these testimonials in El Consejo al Comandante Interino de provincias Internas Madrid, abril 8 de 1787 (104–6–23 Archivo General de Indias, Seville).

[8] For an account of the Comanche and Taovaya in this area between 1759 and 1789 see H. E. Bolton, Athanase de Mezieres and the Louisiana-Texas Frontier 1768–1780, 1: 79–122; Texas in the Middle Eighteenth Century, 89–90, 121–133; The Jumano Indians in Texas 1630–1771 (Quarterly of the Texas State Hist. Assoc., vol. 15, No. 1).

[9] H. E. Bolton, Texas in the Middle Eighteenth Century, 129–133. The present writer is preparing the diaries of these expeditions for publication.

[10] The writer is indebted to Dr. Leslie Spier for the information and suggestions concerning the anthropological aspects of this document.

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(1786)

175
212
701
648



Tally Sheet of Governor Anza, showing a Comanche military formation in 1786.

[facing p. 294]

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Spaniards' guess in the *Note*, accordingly, that the "f" figures represent individuals who without being chiefs won some distinction, was at least half right.

It is perhaps significant that of the number of leaders' lances shown here there are only two kinds, for it is usual in the Plains societies to have only two ranks or degrees of leaders. Further, the limited number of each kind shown suggest that they are emblems of rank. But as to the question whether leaders of the first rank among the Comanche would carry straight lances, those of the second rank hooked ones, there seems to be no certain answer. It is quite possible that this is the meaning of the straight and hooked lances in their positions here. Both types of lances were in general use throughout the Plains. But it cannot be determined that the straight lance is consistently that of a first rank leader and the hooked lance that of a second rank leader. However, this is a distinct possibility among the Comanche. Both types occur as first and second rank emblems among the Plains tribes; the order, and in fact their use or non-use, is quite variable.

TARJA[11]

Tally Sheet (*Tarja*) which Governor Don Juan Bautista de Anza sent in blank on the 19th of May, 1786, to the Comanche Captain General Ecueracapa so that there might be indicated on it by means of lines and signs the chiefs who might set out on the campaign, in the expedition under his command, against the Apaches, the number of men which each detachment may be composed, and the successes that might be achieved. (See pl. 18.)

Explanation of the lines and signs, according to what Oxamaguea, son of the above-mentioned captain, gave to the Governor by word of mouth:

A Chief Quetaniaveni, with his lance by his side, commanding the reconnaissance party of thirty-one men;

a five horses he encountered and recaptured

B CaptainGeneral Ecueracapa with his sword[12]

[11] As indicated in footnote 1 above the original of this Tally Sheet is in the Archivo General de Indias, Seville. A copy of this Tally Sheet, the Informe of Ortiz, the Noticia, and the document here entitled Fourth Enclosure, are the four enclosures accompanying the Relacion. See footnotes 3, 4, and 7 above.

[12] The Spanish word given here, *sable*, for sword, technically signifying a weapon in Spanish military orders. appears to indicate the New Mexican Spaniards' recognition of the formal organization of the Comanche in military societies. So far as the writer knows no description of Comanche tribal life written by Spaniards has been

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Tosaporua:	Oso blanco, de la Rama Yamparica:[31]	White Bear, of the Yamparica branch	8
Pasahuoques:	Ladra Ronco, Idm:	Hoarse Bark, Idm.	20
	Fourth led by Tosapoy		
Ysaquebera:	Lobo Largo, Yupe:	Long Wolf, Yupe[32]	80
Tuchubarua:	Hozo Paxarito, Idm:	Bear Bird, Idm.	9
Encantime:	Savandija, Idm:	Beetle, Idm.	11
	Fifth led by Paraginachi		
Pagabipo:	Vasija de Panza, Yamparica:	Basin Pauch, Yamparica	15
Cunabunit:	El que vió Fuego, Ydm:	He who saw Fire, Idm.	10
Quahuahacante:	Cuero matado:	Dead Hide	8
		Total	593

NOTE

The number of individuals whom they have at their command exceeds at least by a third part that computed by this statement.[33]

. . . . . .[34]

It is a certified copy. Janos 13 of March 1788 in accordance with the order of the Senor Commandante General.

Juan Gasiot y Miralles (Rubric)

FOURTH ENCLOSURE[35]

Names of twenty-two other Comanche despatched by Equeracapa to Governor Don Juan Bautista de Anza in place of eight whom he asked for

[31] Yamparica, Anza stated, comes from the word Yampa, a species of sweet root which abounds in the country of these Indians (Relacion, paragraph 2).

[32] The word Yupe is also written by the Spaniards, Yupinis and Gente de Palo. The latter may be translated as Stick People or Timber People. In this connection it is interesting to note that the Council, mentioned in this Noticia, which selected Equeracapa as chief of all the Comanche, met on the Arkansas river in a spot called La Casa de Palo or the House of Timber or Stick (Relacion, paragraph 2).

[33] It will be observed that this note is apparently a restatement of the last phrase of the opening paragraph of this Noticia that each tent has about three men of arms. The total number of warriors would accordingly be between seventeen hundred and eighteen hundred.

[34] A list of five chiefs' names, all appearing on the Tally Sheet is omitted here since the Spanish equivalents are not given. Of these five names, three, Salambipu, Encajive, and Piaquegipe, do not appear in the lists of the Noticia or the Fourth Enclosure so that their meanings are unknown.

[35] This list of twenty-two names is a fourth enclosure accompanying the Relacion. The other three enclosures as already noted are a copy of the Tally Sheet, the Noticia, and the Ynforme of Ortiz. (See footnotes 4, 7, and 21 above.)

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175 701 648 726 to accompany the detachment of the campaign of the month of July for the purpose of informing themselves of the lands and situation of the enemies in the sierras of the Rio Grande del Norte in order to be able to guide the parties of their nation, which in effect, they did. They conducted themselves with the greatest valor and fidelity in two encounters which they had, having succeeded in the first in taking fourteen prisoners, and in the second, killing three men from a large rancheria of Apache which they attacked themselves alone, because they were ahead of the detachment and came upon a trail along which they went and arrived at it (the rancheria) before the troops.

175 701 551 Capitan Oxamaquea:	Manos Amarillas, hixo mayor del expresado Gral: Yellow Hands, eldest son of the above mentioned Chief.	
Tomanaguene:	Alzo las manos, hijo Segundo: He raises his hands; second son	
Tahuichimpia:	El Suegro, hijo tercero: Father-in-law, third son: This one was with the Governor, sent previously by his father.	
Tosaporua:	Oso blanco:	White Bear
Camquencavite:	Casa Colorada:	Red House
Quemanacare:	El que esta lejos:	He who was far away
Quetampunigue:	El que no han Visto tirado:	He whom they have not seen shot
Nomasonasallo:	El que hizo su saco:	He who made his sack.
Huillome:	El Alesna:	The Awl
Ancachouate:	Hasta sinpunta:	Even without purpose
Tampiallanenque:	Risa grande:	Great Laugh
Sucaque:	Que cosa és:	What is it
Tanansimu:	El Sarsillo:	Small Rake
Amabate:	El sin Caveza:	The One without a head
Tanticanque:	El que come	He who eats
Ybienca:	Muger Colorado	Red Woman
Ecopisura:	Cuchara Arrastrada	Scraping Spoon
Parnaquibitiste:	Oso muy pequeño:	Very small bear
Taoinan:	El Flauta	The Flute
Humavaenvite:	El Gavilan Roxo	The Red Sparrow-Hawk
Tamavencaniguay:	El preguntado por el Anillo:	The One questioned because of the Ring.[36]
Cageneiqueuate:	El Sin Faja	The One without a Sash.[37]

175 It is a copy which I certify. Janos 13 of March, 1788. By virtue of an order of the Senor Commandánte General.

Juan Gasiot y Miralles (Rubric)

UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA,
NORMAN, OKLAHOMA

[36] The Spanish here admits of another translation: "The one asked for the Ring" might be equally correct. This statement applies to several other of the above names so that the correct meaning must necessarily await comparison with the Comanche language itself.

[37] Another word may be added to this list: Encatabebo: Vermejo: The Bright Red One. This name was that of the Comanche chief who returned with Ortiz. (See footnote 7 above.)

/page 36 continued/

If the present factions are not determined by the acculturationist vs. traditionalist split, the split still exists in the realm of value judgement. Exactly what role it does play must be examined still further. The differences between the Kiowas and Comanches seem to be continuances of earlier pre-contact differences. But to pursue this is to get onto very precarious ground.

Conversations on the subject of the factioning with informants both Peyotist and Christian yield two conflicting views. One is that there has always been factionalism and that the tribes will never learn to cooperate unless things unforseen come to pass. The other is that the older generation, now inactive, was not plagued by the dissension which exists among the leaders today. Arguments may be advanced to support both theories.

As far back as the history of the tribes can be traced there are stories of splits and dissensions. The Comanches recall that they were once Shoshones. The stories of the split vary but generally it is believed that there was some disagreement. The Kiowas also have a tradition of a northern origin and a split although it is more difficult to reconcile with what the books say. According to the older Kiowas, the Crows and Kiowas were once the same people. They maintain that they can understand the Crow language fairly well and there is considerable visiting between the two groups today. In pre-reservation days dissensions and splits did not paralyze the activities of the tribe. People could split off from one band and join another. The success of tribal life did not depend upon cohesion and cooperation. But with the advent of the reservation and settlement in one place with sustained relations with the United States government this tendency to split became more and more painful. One could not move for one thing. And the dealings with the outside world demanded a concerted effort on the part of the tribes to achieve success.

31: Jones E-5 (1967-1970) 1972 N06 Comanche N06
Oklahoma

another bunch went back into Texas somewhere and they all went separate there. And now these, I forgot what their name is . . . way up in southwest of California, I think. Well, they talk like us. I don't know their white man name but us Indians call them *ɔkaɨ*. That has meaning of "red Comanches." That's what their name is. Then over there in Utah there's a bunch talk like us, and they talk easy, slow, say every word like us Comanches. They call us word means something like "they come from hot country." You know, some folks tell you that Comanches come from Mexico, but it ain't true. Comanches been here and there but they come from up north somewhere. My folks, as far as they can remember, come from Colorado near Denver somewhere, but it wasn't no Denver in them days. The army run my folks and their folks in Oklahoma, but we didn't belong here way back. We from Colorado. That's where my father's father was killed by them Utes. I still know that country from what the old people told me and what I ask them.

Migrations

In the late 1600s the Comanches began to migrate southward into contact with the Spanish settlements of New Spain and east onto the Plains. The Comanches most likely moved south to be nearer a source of horses, which they first acquired raiding with the Utes in northern New Mexico. The first large group of Comanches appeared in the New Mexico area around 1705. In the succeeding ten or fifteen years, with the Utes, they were constant sources of harassment to the Spanish settlements in the area. In approximately 1726, the Comanches, perhaps feeling their new power with the acquisition of the horse, turned on their former allies, the Utes. Many of the war stories told by Sanapia and some of my older Comanche informants tell of horse-raiding expeditions against the Utes.

In the early eighteenth century the Comanches began to expand to a greater degree onto the Plains. The contraction of the pedestrian Dismal River culture in the central Plains around 1725 is attributed by some authors to the energized predatory equestrian Comanche people. By the middle of the eighteenth century the Comanches had established themselves as a real threat to the Spanish settlements in New Mexico. At first, however, the Spanish policy toward the Comanches was relatively long-suffering because the existence of the mounted and war-like Comanches acted as a protective barrier on New Spain's eastern frontiers against intrusion from that direction by large numbers of French and English. During this period, however, the Comanches made treaties with certain tribes to the north who were sympathetic to the French, and thus French traders began to supply the Comanches with firearms, a trade item which the Spanish had always feared to release to the Comanches. In the late eighteenth century the dangerous situation provoked by the Comanche's acquisition of guns stimulated the Spanish to send military forces against the Comanches, whose center at that time was in southeastern Colorado. In approximately 1790 the northern Comanche bands, perhaps responding to the military pressures imposed by the Spanish, made an alliance with the Kiowa, an alliance which was never broken.

In 1820 Major Long encountered a large camp of Comanches on the upper great bend of the Arkansas River. Prior to this time the Comanches had little

31: Jones E-5 (1967-1970) 1972 NO6 Comanche NO6
Oklahoma

towns of Cache, Snyder, and Indiahoma. The *penatɜkə* continue to be the southernmost of the Comanche bands, centered in the vicinity of Walters, Oklahoma.

Perhaps the most ubiquitous and pervasive problems which have confronted the Comanche in the twentieth century are those directly associated with the process of acculturation with the dominant white culture. The traditional–progressive and conservative–liberal schism which has appeared as a disruptive force in contemporary Comanche society very closely follows band boundaries. As might be expected, the southern band, the *penatɜkə*, a people with a relatively long history of white contact experience, have been more successful in their transition into the twentieth century than have the *yapai* Comanches, the band with the least amount of contact experience. At present the *penatɜkə* are the progressive and liberal Comanches, while the *yapai* stand as the rallying point for all traditionally oriented and conservative Comanches. The *yapai* are joined in the traditionalist camp by the *kwahada* and the *nɔkoni*. This major division is thought of by the Comanches as a division between the northern "tribes" and the southern "tribes."

Most contemporary northern Comanches do not use the term *penatɜkə* for the southern people; rather they call them *hɔnitaiβo*, which means "eat corn like a white man," or, more literally, "corn white men." They are often referred to in English as "Freckles," alluding to the great degree of mixed-blood Comanches who, the northerners believe, fill the southerner's ranks. The southern Comanches are less colorful than the northerners in their invectives, simply stating that the northerners are, for the most part, uneducated, drunken, shiftless, and generally responsible for the poor reputation which the Comanches possess in many of the white communities in southern Oklahoma.

Historical indications of the basis for the present-day dichotomy of Comanche society are suggested by Richardson in *The Comanche Barrier to South Plains Settlement* (1933). Perhaps the most significant single factor responsible for the subsequent divisiveness of the northern and southern Comanche bands is the geographic distance which separated them well into historic times. At the peak of Comanche territorial expansion, as many as 600 miles could have separated the northern bands, ranging in southern Colorado and southwestern Kansas, from southern bands, inhabiting northcentral Texas.

The Kiowa and northern Comanches made a treaty in 1790 which did not include the southern Comanche bands. This treaty was never broken. During the Texas Revolution the southern bands refrained from taking advantage of the chaos in Texas to raid and plunder, while the northern Comanches and their Kiowa allies joined to make one of the most destructive Indian raids in Texas history. After the Mexican defeat in 1837 the Cherokee chief, Bowl, was commissioned to visit the various Comanche bands to seek peace. The southerners were cooperative and friendly; the northerners, however, were insulting and hostile. In the 1850s when the southern bands were put on reservations in Texas, the northern bands continued their raiding activities with the Kiowas. During this time agent officials complained of the demoralizing effects which the northern Comanches had on the southern reservation wards. Further, members of the

32: Gilles O,X-3 (1902-c.1910) 1974
NO6 Comanche NO6
Oklahoma

simply as the department heads had imagined, the department and Chief Parker arrived at this sensible solution: 657 595 [643]

Nothing would be done about men who already had more than one wife, but they were not to take any more wives. Even if one died, a man would have to get along on what wives he had left. All single men would be restricted to marrying one wife. A violation of any one of these restrictions would bring about prosecution under the white man's law.

Among the Indians I knew intimately enough to be familiar with their family lives, I knew of only one who violated this agreement. He was a compulsive drinker, and was about to starve the two-wife family he already had when he took on a third wife. Ultimately he had to move onto the reservation permanently so as to get food, and I lost track of him. His Indian neighbors seemed to be ashamed of his conduct and tried to ignore his existence.

Polygamy had been an economic and social necessity for the Comanches. From the time they entered written history, when they came into contact with the Spanish people of Santa Fe about 1700, until their surrender in 1876 at Fort Sill, their history was one of continuous warfare. They had fought and defeated the Pawnees, the Osages, the Tonkawas, the Navahoes, the Utes, and the Pueblo Indians in New Mexico and Arizona. They had established an inland empire, Comancheria, just as legitimately as Charlemagne established his, and for a time they rode the crest of the horse-buffalo culture. They marketed horses with the Canadian Indians, raided as much as 1,500 miles into Mexico, and had seen the Pacific Ocean. They had stopped the advance of Spain to the north and to the east and that of the French to the west and to the south. Then, in the years of the new kind of warfare which brought about their decline, the United States, the Republic of Texas, the Confederacy, and Mexico were among their enemies. During all this time there was no period when the tribe as a whole was at peace. 595 721 648 175

In war men die young, and the male-female balance is lost. Continual warfare brought about an erosion of the numbers of Comanche men out of all proportion to the natural losses, through death, of the women. It was only through the custom of polygamy that every woman could have a husband and the birthrate could be maintained. 162 165 595

Then too, there had to be many trained hands to keep a Comanche

32: Gilles O,X-3 (1902-c.1910) 1974
NO6 Comanche NO6
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123 stead of just another Indian customer of the store. He was to live thirty-eight more years, and the friendship beginning that day continued to the end. Often there was a stretch of years between our meetings, but when we did meet we made up for lost time. And over the years I came to know him as the man who, I believe, did more to bring about an amicable relationship between our two races than any other man, Indian or white.

551 The Comanche Agency roll gives Che-appy (pronounced Ce-Pa, with a soft C and the accent on the first syllable), the Indian name under which Charley Ross was listed, the birth year of 1863. This means that in 1875, when the roll was compiled, a government clerk considered that he appeared to be twelve years old. His father's name 736 is given as To-wa, and his mother's as Wer-e-kah. No birth years are given for either the father or the mother, nor is there any record of their death. But four or five years later Che-appy is listed as an orphan, and he may well have been an orphan at the time of his enrollment. This means that his father left no surviving brother or blood [597] brother. Had there been such an uncle, Che-appy would have become his son, and thus not an orphan. As to the manner of the father's death, we know only that Charley Ross's daughter Ida (now Mrs. Phil Cato of Riverside, California) is sure that her grandfather was not killed while fighting.

131 Che-appy was born during the last years of the Comanche empire, Comanchería, which stretched from the Arkansas River to the north and the Cross Timbers to the east to the varying southern and western boundaries formed by the range of the southern herd of buffalo, 726 whose guardians the Comanches considered themselves to be. Nothing 643 is definitely known of his early childhood, but it is probable that he was held prisoner, as were most Comanche women and children, during the all-out effort of the Army to subdue the Comanches following the battle of Adobe Walls and until the final surrender in 1875. While this relentless warfare was being waged against the Comanche, on an around-the-clock basis, twelve months of the year, with at times as many as five columns of troops in the field, every horse and mule belonging to the Indians was shot and killed as soon as it was captured, to prevent its recapture. Following the engagement at Palo Duro Canyon, the Army slaughtered 1,400 head of Comanche horses and mules. Then, when the Army wanted to move the captured women and children to the reservation, it had no transportation for

32: Gilles O,X-3 (1902-c.1910) 1974
NO6 Comanche NO6
Oklahoma

them. Everyone who was able was required to walk. An old friend of mine, Wer-que-yah, if he was in the mood and was properly urged, would relate how he, along with many others, including Peet-so, the girl he later married, walked several hundred miles to Fort Sill, in the winter. While this was going on, the hide hunters, with the Army's blessing, were destroying the remnant of the buffalo.

This was Che-appy's childhood background. The first that is definitely known about him, after his appearance on the tribal roll, concerns his presence at the Carlisle Indian School in Pennsylvania, which was established in 1879 by General (then Captain) Richard H. Pratt. Norman G. Holmes, area tribal relations officer of the Anadarko Agency, has found letters and copies of letters that passed between Superintendent Pratt and others at Carlisle and the Indian agent at Fort Sill, whose name was Hunt. One letter to Hunt, dated April 18, 1883, signed by H. Price, states that during the following summer certain pupils, among whom was "Cheapie Ross," would complete the three-year period for which they had been sent to Carlisle. This would mean that Charley Ross began his schooling in the fall of 1880, the beginning of the second year of the school's existence.

The majority of the children in the first student body had been Northern Sioux. Washington officials insisted that Pratt take part of his students from this source, so that they would be hostages against another outbreak of the Sioux. He personally secured 84 Sioux children. He then sent three emissaries into the Southwest, and also wrote to various agents there. This effort netted him 52 more students, bringing the total to 138—16 more than had been authorized by the order establishing the school.

For some time I wondered why other Comanches in our trade territory who were about the same age as Charley could not speak English and had not been to school. Among them was Charley's brother-in-law To-pet-chy, Yok-so-wy, Coffee, and Wer-que-yah, of whom I have spoken. The next oldest Indian I knew who spoke English was Andrew Per-da-sof-pa, who was about ten years younger. His sister and a brother also went to Carlisle. One reason for the gap is, I believe, that when Carlisle was first opened it was too soon after the surrender for teen-age Comanche children to trust themselves to a school run by the white man's army, and especially by one of the officers who had been leading the fight against them. Then too, General Pratt took only fifty-two students from the Southwest area in

32: Gilles O,X-3 (1902-c.1910) 1974
NO6 Comanche NO6
Oklahoma

who would explain to the older man the amount of the check and look to see that we gave him the right amount of money.

In contrast, Charley was always ready to ease the contact between the two races. He sought and found many ways to aid his people in their dealings with the white settlers. Among the tasks which he allotted to himself was that of translating for ministers. Much of the effort to bring the Christian religion to the Comanche was made by ministers unfamiliar with the language. I knew only two ministers who could exhort in the Comanche tongue. The rest had to depend on interpreters when they were preaching. According to Mrs. Cato, her father and mother were charter members of the Baptist church organized at the Deyo Mission on Blue Beaver Creek, west of Lawton and south of the Wichitas. Charley Ross became interpreter for various missionaries connected with the Northern Baptist Convention, now known as the American Baptist Convention. His children and grandchildren are helping to carry on the work of this church organization. Following the death of Reverend Deyo's wife, his brother-in-law, a Mr. Given, and his wife lived at the Deyo Mission parsonage and helped Mr. Deyo carry on his work. When Charley's son was born he was named Given, in honor of this good man. That son, Given M. Ross, now lives in Oklahoma City.

Charley also acted as interpreter in government matters. Of course, I was never present when conferences were held between government officials and tribal leaders, but I am sure Charley was often there as interpreter. I have seen him both in state courts and in the United States District Court, acting as the official interpreter in order that an Indian might have his day in court. On at least one occasion he was used as an interpreter before a legislative committee at the state capitol. This, I believe, was during the consideration of a bill to abolish the Peyote Religious Ceremony. Charley was one who made the wishes of the old fellows known to the state legislature.

These are some of the ways in which Charley Ross spent his long and busy life, smoothing the path between the two races. His task was not easy. Hostility, animosity, bigotry, avarice, and suspicion, if not openly apparent, were but thinly camouflaged on either side when the white man and the Indian were at odds.

In such situations, an interpreter must have the confidence of both parties, or confusion results. One example concerns the signing, in October, 1892, at Fort Sill, of the Jerome Agreement, between the

32: Gilles O,X-3 (1902-c.1910) 1974
NO6 Comanche NO6
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648 657 government and the several interested tribes, which finally resulted in the opening of the Comanche, Kiowa, and Caddo reservations to white homesteading. Many Indian leaders protested the agreement after their own interpreters had explained it to them. They maintained that Joshua Given (the same one mentioned in one of the letters to General Pratt at Carlisle), who was the son of the deceased Kiowa Chief Satank, had translated their demands to the commission inaccurately and had falsely represented what the written agreement contained.

648 754 657 In great rage, the Indian leaders made medicine to bring about Joshua Given's death, as well as the demise of the commissioners. Making an image to represent Given, they threw mud at it. The fatal seizure would take hold where the mud hit the image. The mud struck the image in the chest. On his way home from the council, Joshua Given was stricken by a hemorrhage from the lungs, and shortly thereafter he died.

When old Indians told this story, they had the members of the commission following the young Kiowa in death. At any rate, history bears the old ones out as to the untimely death of Joshua Given.

648 657 Some of the Indian leaders decided to take their grievance to their Great White Father in Washington. Choosing their own interpreter this time, they told their story to Grover Cleveland. President Cleveland assured them that their land would not be taken from them during his administration. Their trip delayed the opening of their land

648 723 657 for homesteads for nine years. But in 1901 the Jerome Agreement was implemented. Each Indian then living was allowed an allotment of 160 acres. This represented the Indian's individual share of the once great empire, Comanchería. The white man got the rest.

186 When they had had such experiences, the older Indians were bound to have certain suspicions of Charley Ross, with his numerous white man's ways, white man's language, and friendships with white

186 302 men. But he was devoted to the old fellows and had their respect. One symbol of the links he kept with them was the braids he wore, even though he wore a hat and his hair was scanty. I remember having thought of the braids as affected. But finally age and observation taught me better. The older Indians all wore their hair in braids, and these were the people he must stay close to so that he could help them.

606 [186] [191] He had other bonds with the old fellows besides his braids. He had a wife who spoke no English. He was fulfilling a Comanche tradition by caring for his wife's parents. Mrs. Ross's father, Mi-he-suah, lived

32: Gilles O,X-3 (1902-c.1910) 1974
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was seventeen years before the outbreak of the Civil War, and predates the Mexican War, the last months of the Republic of Texas, and the admission of Texas into the Union.

We know when the end of Comanche independence came—June, 1875. That means Mo-cho-rook was an active Comanche warrior for a period of thirty-two years. That was thirty-two years for raids along the Trinity and the Brazos. Thirty-two years of traversing Texas on expeditions into Old Mexico. Thirty-two years to drive off the Charley Goodnight cattle, and sell them to the Spanish in New Mexico.

Then don't forget that fairly authentic story that the Comanches, during the Civil War, delivered over ten thousand head of Texas cattle to the Union contractors who were furnishing beef for the Union troops.

I think I was a bit apprehensive, as I read John Graves's *Goodbye to a River*, that Graves might meet up with Mo-cho-rook's shade and his canoe trip down the Brazos might end in disaster.

NOTE: The records at Anadarko show Mo-cho-rook as Comanche Allottee Number C-2307, his birth year as 1826, and show him to have been a Mexican captive. His allotment was about one mile west and four or five north of the present town of Faxon, Oklahoma. It passed into white hands on his death. Casual inquiry brings no information on either his wife or his child. Both did survive him.

33: Mooney E-3,4 (no date) 1907
NO6 Comanche NO6

101 **Comanche.** One of the southern tribes of the Shoshonean stock, and the only one of that group living entirely on the plains. [174] [648] Their language and traditions show that they are a comparatively recent offshoot from the Shoshoni of Wyoming, both tribes speaking practically the same dialect and, until very recently, keeping up constant and friendly communication. 174 131 Within the traditionary period the 2 tribes lived adjacent to each other in s. Wyoming, since which time the Shoshoni have been beaten back into the mountains by

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ASAHABIT—PENATEKA COMMANCHE

174 131 the Sioux and other prairie tribes, while the Comanche have been driven steadily southward by the same pressure. In this southerly migration the Penateka seem to have preceded the rest of the tribe. The Kiowa say that when they themselves moved southward from the Black-hills region, the Arkansas was the N. boundary of the Comanche.

[p. 327A]

33: Mooney E-3,4 (no date) 1907
NO6 Comanche NO6

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131 In 1719 the Comanche are mentioned under their Siouan name of Padouca as living in what now is w. Kansas. It must be remembered that from 500 to 800 m. was an ordinary range for a prairie tribe and that the Comanche were equally at home on the Platte and in the Bolson de Mapimi of Chihuahua. As late as 1805 the North Platte was still known as

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COMANCHE WOMAN

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131 Padouca fork. At that time they roamed over the country about the heads of the Arkansas, Red, Trinity, and Brazos rs., in Colorado, Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas. For nearly 2 centuries they were at
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648 war with the Spaniards of Mexico and extended their raids far down into Durango. They were friendly to the Americans generally, but became bitter enemies of the Texans, by whom they were dispossessed of their best hunting grounds, and carried on a relentless war against them for nearly 40 years. They have been close confederates of the Kiowa
648 since about 1795. In 1835 they made
657 their first treaty with the Government,
131 and by the treaty of Medicine Lodge in 1867 agreed to go on their assigned reservation between Washita and Red rs., s. w. Okla.; but it was not until after the last outbreak of the southern prairie tribes in 1874–75 that they and their allies, the Kiowa and Apache, finally settled on it. They were probably never
161 a large tribe, although supposed to be populous on account of their wide range.
[165] Within the last 50 years they have been terribly wasted by war and disease. They numbered 1,400 in 1904, attached to the Kiowa agency, Okla.

[p. 327-B]

168 traditional Comanche culture fundamentally changed, owing to the extermination of the buffalo—their staff of life—their pacification by the U.S. Army, and their confinement to a reservation in present-day Oklahoma.

Berlandier was not the first white man to collect artifacts from the Comanche and their neighbors. As early as 1779 Governor Juan Bautista de Anza of New Mexico presented to Teodoro de Croix, Military Commander of the Internal Provinces of New Spain, the war headdresses taken from the bodies of the prominent Comanche war chief, Cuerna Verde (Green Horn), and his second in command, Jumping Eagle, after a battle on September 3, 1779, during which the Spanish decisively defeated Cuerna Verde's Comanche.[2] During the fall of 1807 Lieutenant Zebulon M. Pike, pioneer American explorer of the Southern Plains, sent Thomas Jefferson an Apache quiver and arrows and informed the President that he had "collected a variety of curiosities of various savage tribes through which we passed."[3] Unfortunately, I have found no record of the preservation of these earlier artifacts in public or private collections.

The very great majority of Comanche specimens in the museums of this country and abroad were collected within the Reservation Period—i.e. after 1875. The earlier objects in the Berlandier collection provide a solid base for future studies of trends and developments in the history of Comanche Indian arts and crafts. Even though they number less than 20 specimens, the ones Berlandier collected range from war equipment to costume and containers; they illustrate Comanche skills in featherwork, in dressing animal hides, and in decorating tough rawhide and soft skin surfaces with painted designs and trade beads during the second quarter of the 19th century. And they show the use at that time of trade cloth, rolled metal cones, and brass tacks in decorating articles of Indian make.

Comanche Shields Figures 19–23 Plate 17

The Berlandier collection contains three fine examples of the principle defensive weapon of the Comanche—the rawhide shield—commonly made from the breast of the buffalo, where the hide was thickest. Each shield was furnished with a cover of soft skin which enclosed and protected it when not in use.

In his written description of shields Berlandier makes repeated mention of the Comanche custom of tieing small animal skins to the fronts of the shields as war medicines.[4] The shield pictured in Figure 19 still has fragments of two pocket gophers (of the family Geomyinae) tied to it. Appar-

9. Thomas, 1932, pp. 134–38, 142.

3. Jackson, 1966, vol. 2, pp. 275–76. The quiver and arrows probably were from the Lipan Apache. Two of the arrows were deposited in Peale's Museum in Philadelphia and were entered in their Accession Book under the date May 4, 1808. (Accession Book, Peale's Museum, Dec. 4, 1804–October 1842, in Historical Society of Pennsylvania Library, Philadelphia.) These arrows were also mentioned in the Philadelphia *Aurora*, July 27, 1808.

4. See pages 54, 91, 118.

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 171]

35: United States W-4 (no date) 1974
NO6 Comanche NO6
Oklahoma

COMANCHE TRIBE

Caddo, Comanche, Cotton, Grady, Kiowa, Tillman, and Washita Counties, OKLAHOMA
Tribal Headquarters: Anadarko, Oklahoma 73005

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Federal Trust Area
Population: 3,300 (BIA 11/72)

657
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LAND STATUS Total Area: 234,299.45 acres (three tribes) 659
Tribally Owned: 4,373.41 acres 423
Allotted: 229,926.04 acres
(Acreage by individual tribes is not available. Total includes all three tribes.)
Owned Jointly With the Kiowa and Apache Tribes of Oklahoma. (648)
This land is held in trust by the United States under the act of June 24, 1946.

HISTORY AND CULTURE

The Comanche are of the Shoshonean linguistic group. In 1719, they were mentioned as living in what is now western Kansas. Legends indicate that the Comanche may have had horses before the Spanish arrived. Where they obtained them is not known. The horse changed the Comanche's mode of living into a nomadic one. They made little agricultural use of the land and lived in easily transportable tepees. Long known as the finest horsemen of the plains, they had a reputation for courage in battle when facing great odds. They were traditionally hunters. Their diet consisted of game meat, berries, edible roots, but mainly the buffalo, whose skin the Comanche used for clothing, bedding, and shelter.

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For nearly 2 centuries they were at war with the Spaniards in Mexico and raided Mexican settlements as far south as Durango and Zacatecas. Generally friendly to the Americans, they were bitter enemies of the Texans who had dispossessed them of their best hunting grounds. They waged relentless war against them for almost 40 years. Around 1795, they became close confederates of the Kiowa and also allied themselves with the Apache.

Several treaties were consummated between the United States and the Comanche Tribe between 1834 and 1875. In the treaty of 1867 the Comanche, along with their allies, the Kiowa and Apache Tribes, were assigned a tract of land in Oklahoma containing 2,968,893 acres. Individuals were allotted 160 acres each. (657)